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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Setting
Crop production is one of the most important agricultural 
activities in Lesotho. Under crop production, grains take up a 
prominent position in terms of land and time committed. The 
major grains grown in Lesotho are maize, sorghum and wheat. 
During the 19th century, Lesotho was a net exporter of grains 
which were mainly destined for the mining camps of South Africa. 
By the turn of the century, grain exports declined such that by 
the 1930s, Lesotho became a net importer of maize. Exports of 
wheat continued but this was because there was no commercial 
wheat mill in Lesotho. Wheat used to be exported in the raw form 
only to be imported later in a processed form. This however 
excludes wheat which was ground in ordinary hammer mills to meet 
household requirements.
The contribution of crops in the agricultural sector is 
increasingly declining. In 1966, when Lesotho gained
independence, crops contributed about 60 percent of the value 
of agricultural output. This had declined to approximately 22 
percent by 1983/84. Between 1980/81 and 1983/84, the share of 
crops in GDP decreased from 8.2 percent to 3.5 percent.
Grain production in Lesotho is characterized by significant year 
to year variations. Grain production in Lesotho is low, as a 
result large quantities have to be imported from the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA) and others come in the form of food aid. The 
low grain production is in part a result of low yields and poor 
production techniques. One other feature of the Lesotho grain 
industry is the instability of marketing institutions. The 
Lesotho grain marketing system has evolved from the period when 
it was being dominated by private traders to the present whereby 
parastatals are dominating. From the 1800s, private traders sold
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consumer goods and purchased agricultural produce, which included 
grains from farmers. In the late 1940s, marketing co-operatives 
were established and started dealing in wool and mohair and 
later, grains and agricultural inputs.
When Lesotho gained independence in 1966, there was a shift in 
government policy with regard to agricultural marketing in the 
country. Whereas the colonial government tended to be in favour 
of private traders, the new government became inclined towards 
the promotion of public enterprise. Hunter (1987) argues that 
distrust in private enterprise (because of the great slump of the 
1930s) was widespread. The widespread belief was that economic 
problems could be solved by government intervention in the 
economy. The other reason was that it was believed that hitherto 
the producer was confronted with unstable prices, inadequate 
marketing outlets and exploitative middleman (Tarbox, 1979). To 
pave way for the establishment of public agricultural marketing 
institutions, the Agricultural Marketing Act (1967) was passed. 
This act empowered the Minister of Agriculture to control and set 
prices for agricultural products. The act also empowered the 
Minister of Agriculture to regulate the agricultural marketing 
system through gazettes.
The first public institution established was the Lesotho Farmers 
Produce Marketing Corporation (LFPMC) in 1971. LFPMC was a 
government controlled company under which frequent livestock 
auction sales were held at a number of locations in the country. 
In 1973, two parastatals were established by acts of parliament. 
These were the Livestock Marketing Corporation (LMC) and the 
Produce Marketing Corporation (PMC) . LMC took over the functions 
of LFPMC as the sole agency involved in marketing live animals. 
It also became involved in the marketing of wool and mohair. PMC 
became the sole agency under which grains and pulses could be 
formally marketed in the country.
With the introduction of LFPMC, LMC and PMC, the role played by 
private traders in the agricultural marketing system diminished.
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ao nrivate traders were barred from the marketing This is because
1' estock With regard to grains and pulses, private traders
i allowed to trade in them except as agents for PMC.were no longei axx
The LMC ceased operations in 1978 and its operations were taken 
over by the Livestock Products Marketing Services (LPMS) which 
continues to operate today. PMC was dissolved in 1980 and its 
operations were taken over by Co-op Lesotho. Co-op Lesotho was 
originally the Basutoland Co-operative Banking Union (BCBU) which 
was established in 1957 and operated until 1963. Prior to 1974, 
Co-op Lesotho was mainly an agricultural inputs supplier. The 
major agricultural inputs handled by Co-op Lesotho included 
seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. From 1974 to 1980, Co-op 
Lesotho also acted as an agent for PMC. From 1981 until recently, 
Co-op Lesotho has been the dominant formal marketing outlet for 
grains and pulses. Recently Basotho Canners which processes 
baked beans among other things has started buying dry beans 
directly from farmers. Also since 1982/83 producers have been 
given the option of selling directly to the maize mills and the 
wheat mill.
1.2 The Need for the Study
Although there have been previous studies on the marketing of 
grains in Lesotho, most of these studies tend to be descriptive. 
Such studies include those completed by Marketing Sections, 
Divisions of Research and Planning, Ministry of Agriculture 
(1983), Monitoring and Evaluation Team (1985), Wyeth and 
Moletsane (1984b) and Brokken et al (1986). Tarbox (1979) 
analysed the performance of private traders and PMC in marketing 
grams and pulses for the period 1968-1978. Since then many 
velopments have occurred in the Lesotho grain marketing system 
which need to be analysed and documented.
ysis of the Lesotho grain marketing system is important 
reasons- Grain products, e.g Papa. form the staple 
of Basotho, a  larger percentage of the arable land is
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allocated to grain production. Also because of the importance of 
grains to the diet of the Basotho, the government attaches a high 
priority to the attainment of self-sufficiency in grain 
production.
As can be seen from above, the Lesotho grain production/marketing 
system can be said to be characterized by low and variable 
production, low productivity and instability of marketing 
institutions. Because of the importance of grains in the diet of 
Basotho there is need to determine the right marketing system 
which will facilitate production and achieve the government 
objective of attaining self-sufficiency in grain production.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
Overall Objective: To analyse the performance of the Lesotho
grain marketing system.
Sub-objectives: (i) To briefly review the structural changes
which have occurred in the Lesotho 
grain marketing system; the reasons and 
consequences;
(ii) To develop an appropriate methodology to 
analyse and to monitor the performance of 
the grain marketing system;
(iii) To evaluate the performance of the Lesotho 
grain marketing system based on (ii) above;
(iv) To make policy recommendations for 
improvements in the Lesotho grain marketing 
system in order to meet national goals and 
objectives.
1.4 Approach to the Study
In analyzing agricultural marketing systems, economists usually 
categorize the research into three stages. These are (a) 
descriptive studies, (b) diagnostic analysis, and (c)
4
prescriptive studies. Most previous studies on the marketing of 
grains in Lesotho have been descriptive. With the descriptive 
stage completed, diagnostic analysis should be conducted. In the 
diagnostic stage of marketing research, appropriate performance 
measures/criteria are developed. After the descriptive and 
diagnostic analysis, the stage is now set for prescriptive 
analysis.
In this study the first stage is the development of appropriate 
performance measures. The second stage is the evaluation of the 
performance of the grain marketing system against the performance 
measures developed.
1.5 Scope and Outline of the Study
The study covers the three major grains produced in Lesotho 
namely, maize, wheat and sorghum. The other major feature of 
the study is that it concentrates on the formal grain marketing 
system. Grain production is included in the analysis in order 
to see its magnitude and how it affects the marketing system. 
Chapter II provides a brief history of the Lesotho grain 
marketing system. It also describes the structural changes which 
have occurred in the marketing system. Chapter III provides the 
framework for analysing the performance of the Lesotho grain 
marketing system. In the second part of this chapter, the 
performance measures applicable to the Lesotho grain marketing 
system are developed. The next chapter provides the empirical 
evidence of the Lesotho grain marketing system whereby the 
performance of the grain marketing system are evaluated against 
the performance measures developed in the previous chapter. In 
the last chapter conclusions and recommendations for improvements 
in the Lesotho grain marketing system are presented.
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CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LESOTHO GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEM
2.1 Past Grain Marketing Systems
2.1.1 The Development of Grain Production
When the French Protestant Missionaries first arrived in Lesotho
in 1833, they were struck by the central importance of cattle in
the Basotho economy. One of them, Casalis wrote that;
"The tribes of South Africa are essentially 
pastorals... whoever posses no cattle has no means 
of existence." (Casalis as quoted in Kimble 1978, 
p.23).
This is in contrast to Moshoeshoe I's remark in 1838 when he 
said,
"My people are not entirely a pastoral people, they
depend a great measure on the cultivation of the
soil. We cultivate millet, kaffir corn1, maize, 
sweet reed, pumpkins, melons, beans and tobacco... 
our staple produce is kaffir corn". (Ibid. p.23).
It is thought that sorghum and millet were the traditional crops 
grown by Basotho. Maize is said to have arrived in the country 
in the first decades of the 19th century. Ashton (1967) notes 
that maize was known to Basotho before 1820. The introduction 
of maize was apparently through Batlokoa before Basotho moved to 
Thaba-Bosiu. The other hypothesis is that maize came to Lesotho 
through Matebele (Nguni) (Moleko, 1976). It is thought that 
maize was introduced by the Portuguese settlers in the east coast 
of Southern Africa which is mostly inhabited by the Nguni. By
the time the missionaries arrived in Lesotho, maize had become
the second staple to Basotho. By the turn of the century the 
exports of maize far exceeded those of sorghum (Appendix A ) .
1 This refers to sorghum
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Wheat was introduced in Lesotho by the missionaries. They were 
struck by the amount of work involved in the cultivation of 
sorghum and argued that wheat demanded less labour. Furthermore, 
wheat was strongly in demand by white farmers in South Africa and 
traders. It was also argued that Basotho could earn cash income 
from wheat production and thus buy European manufactured goods. 
In most cases wheat was grown exclusively for exchange.
By the end of the 19th century, Lesotho grain was exported to 
Kimberley, the Witwatersrand and the Orange Free State. However, 
Lesotho grain production suffered a severe blow towards the end 
of the century and production began to decline. Kimble (1978 and 
1985), Murray (1980) and Moleko (1976) have dealt with the 
reasons which led to the decline of grain production in Lesotho. 
The reasons include the introduction of taxes to force Basotho 
to work in the mines in RSA, the taxing of grain from Lesotho to 
the gold fields and certain areas of RSA which was contrary to 
the spirit of the 1891 Customs Union Agreement, and the 
importation of cheap grain from the highly capitalized 
agriculture of the American mid-west and Australia.
Export of grain from Lesotho fluctuated with disasters like 
drought. The early 1930s became very disastrous to grain 
production in the country. This was a result of the coincidence 
of the Great Depression with an exceptional drought of 1932/33. 
Wheat production survived and recovered but maize did not. Since 
that time, Lesotho has been a net importer of maize.
2.1.2 Private Traders
It appears Basotho were already trading with neighbouring African 
nations long before the arrival of the missionaries in 1833. 
Basotho exchanged animal products, handicrafts and natural 
resources with other neighbouring African nations. Formal 
trading in Lesotho came with developments in the Cape Colony when 
Dutch settlers moved into the interior of the sub-continent. The 
movement of Dutch settlers from Cape Colony in 1836 into the
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interior meant that itinerant traders accompanied them. The 
Voortrekkers were mainly pastoralists which meant they did not 
cultivate grain. This meant that there was a great demand for 
grain by the Voortrekkers which was met by Basotho grain.
The one factor above all others, however, which contributed to
the development of trading in Lesotho was the opening up of the
diamond fields at Kimberley in 1867, an area entirely incapable
of supporting the large numbers of prospectors who poured into
it (Walton, 1958). Kimble (1978) argues that the sudden
convergence of tens of thousands of people in a barren and
hitherto rarely freguented part of South Africa created an
unprecedented demand for foodstuffs. The burst in demand from
the diamond fields and other places led to an upward tendency
in grain prices. In 1869 a muid2 of wheat sold for 22s 6d and a
muid of maize or sorghum for 12s 6d - 14s 6d. By 1874 the same
quantity of wheat sold for 40s, maize for 17s-20s and sorghum
for 18s-20s (Kimble, 1978). Basotho responded to the demands
of the mining camps by increasing grain and livestock production.
Murray (1981, p.11) has written that
"Basotho bought ploughs, planted assiduously and 
sold grain to meet the needs of the distant mining 
camps. They responded with such zeal and success
that on the other hand the missionaries expressed
anxiety lest their material prosperity endanger their 
spiritual progress."
From the late 1800s travellers to Lesotho noted the intensity
of cultivation throughout the country.
"Today hundreds of wagons penetrate and traverse 
(the country-side) in every direction collecting the 
grain which the country produces. The cultivation c£ 
cereals has markedly increased and the plough has 
almost everywhere replaced the native hoe."
(Rolland as quoted in Kimble 1978, p.200).
In the 1870s, evidence suggests that the production and sale of
grain was the most important source of income to Basotho. In
2 A muid was a standard bag in which grain was sold and 
purchased and weighed approximately 200 lbs
1880, the Acting governor's agent, Emile Rolland, pointed out 
that the income earned by Basotho from the sale of grain was five 
times that earned from labouring and transport - riding put 
together (Kimble, 1985 and Murray, 1980).
Most traders who established themselves in Lesotho were of 
British origin. Most of these traders had probably left England 
to make fortunes in the Kimberley diamond mines. When they got 
to Kimberley they realized the need and opportunity for providing 
the mining camps with food. They then started buying grain and 
livestock from Basotho and sold them in the mining camps.
Before the promulgation of formal trading regulations in 1871, 
entry into trading was relatively easy. A trader who wished to 
settle in any place had first to get the sanction of the local 
chief to put up a store. This obtained, he applied to the 
government for a licence and when this was issued he was assigned 
a small piece of ground on which to build and could start trading 
(Selwyn, 1980). Because of the ease of entry into trading, 
Hunter (1987) has postulated that during this period the trading 
structure was highly competitive.
In the early years of trading in Lesotho, traders established 
fixed trading stations around mission stations. By 1854, two 
resident traders had established themselves in Morija (Germond, 
1967). Other traders had established themselves around the other 
mission stations of Beersheba, Mekoatleng and Thaba-Bosiu. At 
the trading stations, traders both sold consumer goods and bought 
farm produce. In addition to these, traders offered other 
services which included provision of credit, milling services, 
acting as government agents in the distribution of famine relief, 
seed and fertilizer and providing postal services (Stutley, 
1960) .
With regards to grains, traders purchased in bags which were 
then called muids. Traders started selling grains by weight 
from 1919 as a result of farmers complaining about Thabana-Morena
9
bags. The Thabana-Morena bags involved traders filling bags with
grains until making a sort of a pyramid. Traders were not
satisfied until some grain began to drop on the ground. Having
brought the overfilled bags of grain, they afterwards filled
their bags to the proper weight of 2001bs. Out of two Thabana-
Morena bags traders got three 200 lbs bags. Farmers began to
protest the practice of Thabana-Morena bags and in 1916 the
matter was taken up by the Basutoland National Council (BNC).
In a meeting held at Maseru on 8'” February, 1919, between the
Basutoland Chamber of Commerce (BCC) and the BNC, the problem of
Thabana-Morena bags was resolved. It was resolved with
Proclamation No.28 of 1919 (Purchase and Sale of Grain by Weight)
which was further refined by Proclamation No.49 of 1920 (Lesotho
National Archives (LNA) File S3/26/12/17). The other complaints
against traders dealings in grains, were that traders took
advantage of people's need to exchange their produce rapidly in
order to pay tax. In a letter from Chief Masupha to the High
Commissioner, it is stated that;
"When the time for the payment of hut tax come the 
traders buy the cattle and grain of Basotho at a \ay 
low price and at the time of harvest the traders buy 
the crops at a very low price, but the traders sell 
cattle and grain to Basotho people for high prices." 
(LNA, S3/22/2/2).
Towards the end of the 19th century when grain prices fluctuated 
as a result of climatic conditions and imposition of tariffs by 
the RSA on Lesotho grain, Basotho farmers blamed traders. The 
main complaint by farmers against traders involved prices. 
Basotho could not understand why, when they had plentiful 
supplies of grain, traders purchased it at very low prices 
whereas in times of scarcity they had to pay high prices to 
traders. The Chiefs felt that they were being dealt with 
unfairly and ordered a complete boycott of all stores. The 
Chiefs also forbade people to sell certain necessities of life 
such as milk, fuel etc to Europeans. When the new wheat crop was 
harvested, the sale of it was also forbidden by the Chiefs. This 
was more prevalent in the district of Berea which was ruled by 
Chief Masupha.
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On the other hand, traders argued that Basotho did not understand 
the laws of demand and supply. They also argued that in times 
of food shortages they had to import grain at high cost and did 
[ not make much profit from the imported grain. Traders also 
- argued that the imposition of tariffs on Lesotho grain meant that 
1 they had to buy grain from farmers at low prices so as to compete 
! with the cheap American and Australian imported grains.
! Before the invention of motor vehicles, traders purchased grain 
from farmers and transported the grain in ox-wagons and pack 
1 animals. Some traders owned oxen and pack animals while others 
contracted transport operators.
Other traders' marketing practices have been discussed in full 
in Hunter (1987), Selwyn (1980), Rantheba (1985) and Mokitimi 
(1988) and Hunter and Mokitimi (1990). These studies indicate 
that traders had both monopoly and monopsony power. This is 
because in the market in which farmers bought consumer goods 
they faced a single seller, a monopolist. In the market in whichr
r they sold farm produce, they faced the same single trader, a 
L monopsonist. The operations of traders in the grain marketing 
system were legislatively curtailed in the early 1970s when 
public corporations (parastatals) were entrusted with the 
functions of grain marketing.
r
a 2.1.3 Co-operatives
 ^ Co-operatives in Lesotho began in 1948 when the first Registrar 
of Co-operatives was appointed (Biggs, 1964). Information on the 
events which led to the establishment of co-operatives is scantyi but Ashton (1967) reports that the establishment of co-operatives3 was encouraged by the Roman Catholic Bishop, J.C. Bonhomme. The3
first co-operatives were wool and mohair marketing co-operatives 
and were primarily established because producers felt that 
traders were costing too much or that the services which they 
provided were inadequate (Biggs, 1964). Farmers thought by 
eliminating the middlemen (traders), marketing costs could be
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lowered which would result in a gain to them in the form of 
higher prices. Co-operatives were also established to break 
traders' monopoly and monopsony power which prevailed at the 
time.
Marketing co-operatives handling grains were known as 
Agricultural or Farmers' Societies. By 1951, four Agricultural 
or Farmers Societies were in operation. These agricultural 
societies operated as consumer and supply societies, i.e they 
purchased consumer goods and agricultural implements and inputs 
on behalf of their members. The major activities of agricu] cur^.1 
societies was retail trading in consume] guodt. and the supply of 
agricultural inputs rather than purchasing farm prouuce. Stutley 
(1960) has argued that agricu tural societies were not co­
operatives but "buyinj clubs".
In order to assist agricultural societies with the purchase and 
storage of crops, the Basutoland Co-operative Banking Union 
(BCBU) was established i i 1957. The functions of BCBU were to 
finance primary societies in the marketing of primary produce, 
provision of credit ar. the supply of fertilizer and other 
agricultural requisites. Thus the BCBU provided the primary 
societies with creuit with which they could purchase members' 
farm produce. In September, 1960 the BCBU in conjunction with 
the Farmers Co-operative Union of South Africa (FCU) formed the 
Basutoland Co-operative Federation (BCF). The BCF was
established mainly for the purposes of produce marketing and 
distribution of agricultural requisites for farmers. The BCF was 
only operational for one year after which it was liquidated and 
its functions taken over by the BCBU. Biggs (1964) reports that 
after this, the situation became thoroughly confused. The BCBU 
operated a produce marketing section in place of the BCF but the 
FCU gave credit to and marketed produce for the marketing 
societies of the country. Thus rendering the produce marketing 
section of the BCBU redundant.
In September 1963, the BCBU encountered financial problems and
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its registration was cancelled. The operations of the BCBU were 
taken over by the Finance and Marketing Co-operative Union of 
Basutoland (known as CUB). The CUB, however, could not be 
regarded as a true co-operative in the fullest sense because the 
government became a member and by virtue of its financial 
interest, virtually exercised control.
Table 2.1: Number of Agricultural Societies and Membership
Year________________ Aqric. Societies________________________ _Membership
1951 4 -
1952 5 -
1953 7 812
1954 7 845
1955 9 848
1956 7 964
1957 11 -
1958 6 -
1959-63 NA NA
Source: Basutoland Colonial Annual Reports.
The above narrative indicates that after co-operatives were 
established they encountered problems such that by the early 
1960s, they collapsed. Biggs (1964) lists the following reasons 
as being the causes of the collapse of the co-operative movement 
in the country:
1 (i) Mis-management
1 (ii) Over-payment of staff
1 (iii) Farm produce prices set too high which resulted in
1 societies incurring financial loses
’ (iv) Misappropriation of funds.
I
• It was earlier argued that one reason co-operatives were 
] established was to break traders' monopoly and monopsony power.
; The establishment of co-operatives posed the first real 
J competition traders had ever experienced. Traders were 
) determined to hit back at the co-operatives with a few effective 
"weapons" at their disposal (Stutley, 1960). Biggs (1964), the 
Basutoland National Council (1964), Hunter (1987) and Mokitimi 
3 (1988) present evidence on the various "weapons" used by traders
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to counteract co-operatives' competition. These "weapons" 
include increasing farm produce prices to be higher than the ones 
offered by co-operatives, refusing to sell consumer goods to 
farmers unless farmers sold farm produce to them and refusing to 
offer farmers credit. All these reasons led to the col]apse of 
the co-operative movement in the country such that by 1966, when 
Lesotho gained independence, there were few co-operatives in the 
country. At present there are very few farm produce marketing 
co-operatives in the country, most of which are not functional. 
The only co-operatives which are active and still growing are 
Wool and Mohair Growers' Associations. The collapse of the co­
operative movement meant that traders continued to be the 
dominant force in the Lesotho agricultural marketing system.
2.1.4 The Produce Marketing Corporation
In an attempt to pave way for a new agricultural marketing system 
for the country in anticipation of gaining independence, the BNC 
in 1964 held hearings on the then existing livestock and 
agricultural produce marketing system. In these hearings Basotho ' 
came out very strongly against traders' involvement in the ] 
agricultural marketing system. Most Basotho civil servants c 
wanted government involvement in the agricultural marketing £ 
system. Hunter (1987) argues that distrust in private enterprise 1 
(because of the great slump of the 1930s) was widespread. The  ^
widespread belief was that economic problems could be solved by I 
government intervention in the economy. The other reason was  ^
that it was believed that hitherto the producer was confronted v 
with unstable prices, inadequate marketing outlets and £ 
exploitative middleman (Tarbox, 1979).
]
One year after Lesotho gained independence, the Agricultural 1 
Marketing Act (1967) was passed. The major objective of this c 
act was to regulate the agricultural marketing system in the c 
country. The specific purposes of this act are to;
(a) ensure that each producer is paid prices which adequately * 
reflect the value of the quantity and quality of the
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product in Lesotho and on external markets,
(b) improve the value of each product in Lesotho and on 
external markets by adequate preparation, processing and 
marketing,
(c) ensure that products in Lesotho are of good quality, 
fairly priced and accurately represented,
(d) obtain adequate information to assess activities relating 
to production, preparation, processing and marketing of 
products and supplies; and
(e) control and improve the exportatxon and importation of 
products and supplies; and in particular to -
(i) ensure that exportation and importation of 
products and supplies occur at times, in 
quantities and by means most beneficial to 
Lesotho; and
(ii) prohibit the importation of products and 
supplies which are unsafe or inappropriate for 
the function for which they are to be sold.
In addition, the act empowered the Minister of Agriculture to 
regulate prices: "The Minister may prohibit any person who is
dealing in the course of trade... from purchasing or selling at 
a price other than a fixed price or a price calculated in 
accordance with a specified basis". The Agricultural Marketing 
Act was followed by series of gazetted regulations which fixed 
prices and margins and controlled the exports of wheat and maize. 
The Agricultural Marketing - Price Control Regulations of 1973 
were the first to stipulate price ceilings for bread flour, 
sifted meal, and maize meal.
In 1973 the Produce Marketing Corporation (PMC) was established 
under Act No.14 of 1973. The establishment of PMC was a result 
of the government policy that agricultural marketing in the 
country be carried out by the public sector. Government's policy 
was to carry out farm marketing as a public sector activity 
because traders were seen to be exploitative and because of the 
need to maintain marketing services to remote communities where
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private traders may not maintain at a fair price (FAO, 1980). 
The functions of PMC were as follows:
(a) to advise the Minister in all matters related to 
the production, preparation, processing and marketing
of agricultural products and the marketing of 
agricultural supplies;
(b) to regulate and control the marketing process for
commodities and products as indicated by the 
Minister in pursuance of the Agricultural Marketing 
Act 1967;
(c ) to buy commodities and products and arrange for their 
sale;
(d) to secure the most favourable arrangements in respect 
of the country's economy for the purchase of 
commodities and products; their preparation, 
transport, storage, processing and sale;
(e) to introduce quality standards and grading systems to 
which price differentials shall be related, and
(f ) to secure domestic supply in relation to demand so as 
to stabilize as far as possible producer and consumer 
prices throughout the year and between different crop 
years.
The commodities handled by PMC included grains and their 
products, pulses, fruits and vegetables. There was also a clause 
in the Act indicating that PMC can handle any other product 
designated by the Minister by notice in a gazette.
PMC operated through a network of agents. The agents were often 
traders who had previously dealt in the buying and selling of 
agricultural products on their own and area-based development 
projects. With the introduction of PMC, traders could only buy 
and sell farm produce as agents of PMC. The largest buying 
agents were Co-op Lesotho and the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development 
Project. In 1974/75, PMC had 38 agents and this increased to 
43 in 1975/76. The number of PMC's agents further increased to 
56 in 1976/77. It should be noted that the number of marketing
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outlets was higher because some of the agents had multiple 
stations, e.g Frasers and Co-op Lesotho.
To enable agents to purchase produce, PMC provided them with 
weekly cash advances which were based on estimated quantities 
to be purchased during the week. At the end of the week (Friday), 
the cash advance was reconciled with quantities of produce 
actually purchased. Every Friday PMC credited the agents with 
handling charges and commission. In 1974/75, the agents' 
commission for wheat was M2.00 per tonne and this works out to 
be 3.3 percent of the producer price while the commission for 
beans was 4.5 percent of the producer price. For maize and 
sorghum the commission was "negotiable".
In the period 1975-78, PMC purchase prices for grains were set 
at or below RSA floor prices and sales to the PMC by farmers 
were insignificant. In 1978/79, PMC purchase prices were raised 
above RSA producer prices and this resulted in small deliveries 
by farmers (Table 2.2). This was achieved at a cost of large 
financial losses to the PMC because of the low resale prices and 
high handling costs. PMC wheat purchases increased rapidly in 
1977/78 because the government's Co-operative Crop Production 
Programme (CCPP) which operated a share-cropping service with 
farmers delivered all its wheat to PMC.
Table 2.2: Quantities of Crops Marketed by PMC (m t )
Year Wheat Maize Sorcjhum Beans
1975/76 43 - - 4 299
1976/77 361 - - 3 185
1977/78 2675 - - 1 637
1978/79 3129 90 69 516
Source: FAO (1980).
PMC folded in 1979 because of several problems which included:
(a) lack of skilled management,
(b) insufficient operating margins,
(c) no rational pricing structure for crop purtiBses;
(d) lower volumes of marketed throughput than planned.
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2.1.5 Area-based Development, Projects
Before Lesotho gained independence, there were several area-based 
development projects, such as Tebetebeng. After independence, 
the Lesotho Government began to realize the disappointingly low 
level of farmer response to rural development programmes. It was 
thought that rural development programmes failed because they did 
not yield benefits to farmers immedxately. This recognition 
influenced the government to seek international and agency 
funding for area-based crash projects aimed at modernising 
agriculture and producing visible results within a relatively 
short period.
(a) Leribe/Khomokhoana Project (1975-1980).
Khomokhoana Rural Development Project (KRDP) began operations 
in 1970 as the Leribe Pilot Project (LPP) financed by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Pilot Project was
located near Hlotse in Leribe district. It was designed to
demonstrate the impact on production and the income of an 
integrated approach to agricultural development within the 
existing land tenure system. It concentrated on the application 
of relatively simple packages of inputs, including mechanisation, 
improved seeds, insecticides, fertilizer and extension services. 
LPP was phased out in 1975 and incorporated into a much larger 
agricultural project in the Khomokhoana catchment area.
The enlarged project, known as the Khomokhoana Rural Development 
Project, was financed by the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA) through the FAO. The goal of KRDP was to intensify 
crop and livestock production through improved systems of credit, 
inputs, and marketing facilities, integration of conservation 
works with agricultural production and involvement of farmers 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). KRDP was terminated in mid-1980, at 
the end of the planned funding period.
KRDP was a designated agent of PMC in the marketing of grains
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and pulses but only purchased pulses on behalf of PMC. It never 
handled any maize and sorghum because it appeared farmers had no 
surpluses. Wheat was usually sold by farmers direct to co­
operatives in the RSA, notably the Ficksburg Co-operative. KRDP 
purchased 231 tonnes of beans in 1976 and 93 tonnes of beans and
0.9 tonnes of peas in 1977. The project marketed potatoes 
independently.
(b) Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project (1974-1976)
The Sengu River Agricultural Extension Project (SRAEP), which 
covered the two southern districts of Mohales Hoek and Quthing, 
began operations in 1974. The project was also funded by the 
UNDP. The objectives of the project were to assist the 
Government of Lesotho in meeting its national objective of 
raising agricultural production above subsistence levels and to 
promote cash cropping. The project ended in 1976.
Like KRDP, SRAEP acted as an agent of PMC in the marketing of 
farm produce. Between 1974 and 1977, SRAEP purchased 129 tonnes 
of beans, 258 tonnes of wheat and 4.5 tonnes of peas on behalf 
of PMC.
(c) Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project (1973-1979)
The Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project (TBRDP) began in 1973 
and was jointly funded by the World Bank (IDA) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
objectives of TBRDP included to increase the income derived from 
crop and livestock production, to control erosion and provide 
data for the preparation of similar rural development projects 
in other areas. The project ended in 1979.
Under the project, some 70 Village Distribution Points (VDPs) 
supplied by 7 project operated stores were established. A VDP 
was a store operated by a local villager on a commission basis 
and mostly sold farm inputs to farmers. Also some 74 km of
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access roads were constructed in order to facilitate the supply 
of farm inputs and the marketing of produce. TBRDP was one of 
the most important PMC's agents in terms of produce handled. For 
example, of the 43 tonnes of wheat handled by PMC in 1974/75, 33 
tonnes were from TBRDP.
(d) Basic Agricultural Services Programme (1977-1981)
The strategy of agricultural development in the mid-1970s was 
centred on area-based projects. Most, if not all, area-based 
projects did not have a significant impact on agricultural 
development in the country. It was then realised that area-based 
projects had several limitations which included lack of co­
ordination with government programmes as they were in most cases 
autonomous. It was then decided to absorb these projects into 
the planning and administrative structure of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and to pursue programmes with a wide and more 
diffused impact. It was within this context that Basic 
Agricultural Services Programme (BASP) was conceived and 
implemented. The programme was to involve the development of 
physical infrastructure such as roads and stores, the provision 
of inputs, credit, extension and produce marketing facilities. 
Unlike the previous area-based projects, BASP covered the area 
encompassing the Lowlands i.e from Butha-Buthe to Quthing 
districts. It was divided into 6 blocks. Block I was funded by 
the United Kingdom, Block II and III by the Federal Republic of 
Germany (GTZ), Block IV and V by the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and block VI by the World Bank.
With regard to marketing facilities, BASP operated VDPs, lock­
up and unit level stores. Some VDPs were inherited from TBRDP 
and some were built in places where TBRDP did not operate. A 
lock-up store sold farm inputs and implements and also acted as 
a marketing outlet for farmers' produce. Each lock-up store 
operated 2 times a week and the other days was closed hence the 
name lock-up store. The lock-up stores were operated by a team 
of people who moved from one lock-up store to another. Each team
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operated 3 lock-up stores. Unit level stores were larger stores 
than the VDPs and lock-up stores. Unit level stores carried a 
more complete line of farm inputs and in addition acted as 
marketing outlets for farmers' produce. Each unit level store 
served several lock-up stores in a given area.
(e) Co-operative Crop Production Programme (1976-1980)
In 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture undertook to share-crop 
large areas of arable land in the Lowlands for the growing of 
winter wheat. This project was known as Co-operative Crop 
Production Programme (CCPP) and based on the traditional concept 
of share-cropping, with the government and farmers as partners. 
The objective of CCPP was to increase the country's winter wheat 
production by exploiting the large proportion of land which 
usually lies fallow in winter. The government supported all 
expenses including seeds, ploughing, planting, discing, 
harrowing, fertilizer and combine harvesting. Land-holders were 
responsible for non-mechanised operations which included weeding 
and threshing where combine harvesters could not reach the 
fields. South African farmers were involved as contractors for 
the various mechanised operations. Because the government in 
most cases incurred all production and harvesting costs, the 
programme was christened Ahlama U-je (manna has fallen from 
heaven) by farmers (Phororo, 1979). After harvest, the wheat was 
then divided equally between the government and land-holders. 
The government share was sold to PMC. As previously noted, PMC 
wheat purchases increased in 1977 as a result of CCPP's wheat 
deliveries.
The project design was that 12,000 ha would be planted, but only 
3,100 ha were involved in the scheme. CCPP encountered problems 
which included a shortage of competent staff to manage the 
project and this meant that contractors were overpaid, excessive 
fertilizer used, and seeding rates exceeded. There was also the 
problem of storage for the harvested grain. The government 
reportedly sustained losses of between M300,000 and M400,000.
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The programme was modified t,o provide for cost sharing between 
government and farmers, except for the ploughing costs, which 
were to be contributed by government as a subsidy. This 
modification did not prevent the programme from incurring further 
substantial losses. In mid-1979, following much criticism from 
donors, the programme was prematurely terminated.
(f) The Food Self-Sufficiency Programme (1980-Present)
CCPP was regarded as a failure and was wound up and replaced by 
the Food Self-Sufficiency Programme (FSSP) in 1980. Initially 
FSSP was financed by Republic of China (Taiwan). The funding was 
to be for five years. The objectives of FSSP were outlined as:
(i) to achieve self-sufficiency in maize and sorghum 
production within a period of 5 years,
(ii) to achieve full utilization of government-owned farm 
machinery and equipment, and
(iii) to initiate agricultural production based on 
village co-operatives.
It was intended that in the first year, the programme would aim 
at demonstrating the reliability of the technology used and that, 
therefore, all inputs costs would be borne by it. This practice 
also led to FSSP being christened Ahlama-U-ie like CCPP. After 
harvesting, the output was to be shared equally between the 
project and farmers. In the second year, farmers were to pay 
half of the production costs and receive three-quarters of the 
output. From the third year onwards, all costs were to be borne 
by farmers.
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Table 2.3: FSSP Grain Production fmt) and Number of Farmers 
Participating (1980/81-1986/87).
Year Wheat Maize Sorqhum Number of
1980/81 767 13 922 469 13 878
1981/82 4 412 24 945 105 27 418
1982/83 7 656 21 000 647 28 782
1983/84 7 656 9 986 1 005 18 954
1984/85 - 37 563 - 8 924
1985/86 - - - 9 989
1986/87 - - - 10 906
1987/88 - - - 12 410
Source: FAO (1983) and TOU.
(g) Lessons From Development Projects and Programmes.
The record of all the area-based development projects and 
programmes were disappointing. The projects carried out 
demonstrations of crop production using "improved" practices and 
purchased inputs. In most cases these cropping systems incurred 
heavy losses in unfavourable years and as a result there was no 
uptake by farmers outside the demonstration areas of the high 
input, high technology methods which were being advocated. None 
of the projects achieved their stated goals, and while there were 
many accomplishments, the projects were actually failures if 
judged against their stated goals. The reasons for the failure 
of the projects include:
(i) The goals themselves were over-optimistic both in terms 
of what was likely to be achieved in increasing yields 
and in acceptance rates by farmers;
(ii) The hazards of farming in Lesotho were consistently 
underestimated;
(iii) Crop losses resulting from projected soil erosion tended 
to be over-estimated;
(iv) The cost and effort required to construct physical 
earthworks to control erosion were out of line with the 
benefits perceived by farmers;
(v) Integrating autonomous projects with a high level of 
expatriate staff into district and national organisations
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proved difficult;
(vi) The projects were based on the false assumption that the 
bulk of the rural population were committed farmers who 
were looking for methods of investing additional resources 
and labour into more intensive farming systems.
2.2 Present Grain Marketing System
The Lesotho grain marketing system is usually categorised into 
formal and informal marketing systems. The informal marketing 
system is concerned with the selling and buying of grain amongst 
neighbours and grinding at traders' hammer mills without going 
through official marketing channels. Most of the locally 
produced grains are traded in the informal market. This is more 
pronounced in sorghum because very little of it goes through 
formal channels. In the informal market, farmers usually deliver 
the grain to traders who grind the grain for a charge in their 
hammer mills and roller mills. The informal grain marketing 
system seems to be complex and very little is known about it.
The present Lesotho formal grain marketing system is dominated 
by Co-op Lesotho which is a parastatal designated to purchase 
farm produce and sell agricultural inputs. Very few traders are 
involved in the grain marketing system. The other major players 
in the Lesotho grain marketing system are the maize mills and the 
wheat mill. The formal marketing channels for maize, wheat and 
sorghum are presented in figures 2 .1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
2.2.1. Co-op Lesotho
In 1963, the Finance and Marketing Co-operative Union of 
Basutoland (CUB) took over the operations of the Basutoland Co­
operative Banking Union (BCBU) which had become insolvent and was 
liquidated. CUB took on the name Co-op Lesotho in 1972. In 
1980, Co-op Lesotho and PMC were merged and came to be known as 
Co-op Lesotho LTD.
Co-op Lesotho is a co-operative registered on 2n(l February 1981 
under the Co-operative Societies Proclamation of 1947 as amended. 
It has eight members viz;
(i ) Government of Lesotho.
(ii) Lesotho Poultry Co-operative Society Ltd,
(iii) Lesotho Co-operative Handicrafts LTD,
(iv) Lesotho Co-operative Credit Union League LTD,
(v) Mafeteng Co-operative District Union,
(vi) Leribe District Co-operative Union LTD,
(vii) Phela-U-Phelise Multipurpose Co-operative Society
LTD
(viii) Lesotho Handspun Mohair Co-operative Society LTD. 
The Government of Lesotho holds 98 percent of the share capital. 
Although Co-op Lesotho is a registered co-operative, the 
government control of the organisation by virtue of its financial 
contribution makes it a parastatal.
According to the by-laws of Co-op Lesotho, its main functions 
are:
(i) to operate as a marketing outlet for farmers'produce 
of food grains and pulses;
(ii) to operate as a commercial trading organisation, 
dealing mainly in agricultural inputs but also in 
other items as found profitable;
(iii) to serve as a co-operative apex organisation
promoting the development of primary societies.
Co-op Lesotho, in order to be operational during the agricultural 
off-season, deals in other items. The other items consist of 
food products such as maize and wheat meal, coal, building 
materials and malt packaging. It also operates a recently 
started insurance agency.
Co-op Lesotho, at present, owns approximately 43 depocs spreaa 
throughout the country but mainly concentrated in the Lowlands. 
It also owns two yards, the maize yard at Maputsoe and the coal 
yard at Maseru Railway Station (Industrial Site). The depots are 
divided into three regions: north, central and south (Table 2.4).
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Table 2.4: Location of Co-op Lesotho Depots by Region (19861
Northern Central Southern
Maputsoe
Mokomahatsi
Moletsane
Letseng
Mokhotlong
Makhiseng
Butha-Buthe
Leri.be
Khabo
Mahobong
Pitseng
Peka
Lighobong
Maize yard (Maputsoe)
Maseru
Mazenod
Mohales Hoek (main) 
Mohales Hoek (sub)
Coal Yard (Maseru) Mt.Moorosi
Teya teyaneng 
Ha Ntsi 
Mantsonyane 
Pilot
Thaba Tseka 
Mahloenyeng 
Sefikeng 
Semonkong 
Thuathe
Quthing
Mafeteng (main) 
Mafeteng (sub)
Ntjepeleng 
Matelile 
Koti-Sephola 
Tsoloane 
Mpharane 
Alwyns Kop 
Qacha's Nek 
Sehapa
Thabana Morena 
Sehlabathebe 
Kolo_____________
Source: Ronsholt (1984) and Co-op Lesotho
The number of Co-op Lesotho depots has been fluctuating mainly 
because some of them have been taken over by area—based 
development projects and some have been closed as they have been 
found not to be viable (Table 2.5). The number of depots 
increased in 1982 as a result of the merger of Co-op Lesotho and 
PMC. In October 1984, twelve depots were closed down because 
they were found not to be viable and a further two were taken 
over by the Phuthiatsana Project.
Table 2.5: Number of Co-op Lesotho Depots (1981-1988)
Year Number of Depots
1981
1982
1983
1984
38
56 
58
57 
43 
43 
43 
43 
43
1984 (October)
1985
1986
1987
1988
Source: Ronsholt (1984) and Co-op Lesotho.
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Co-op Lesotho purchases grain through its depots. After the 
grain is purchased from farmers, it is taken by road transport 
to Maseru or Maputsoe. In Maseru, maize is delivered either to 
the Maseru Roller Mills (MRM) or Lesotho Maize Mills (LMM). 
Before 1986, most of the maize was delivered to Lesotho Milling 
Company (LMC) in Maputsoe as the LMM was not operational then. 
In Maputsoe the maize is stored at Co-op Lesotho maize yard 
before being delivered to the mill. The maize yard is adjacent 
to the mill. The maize is stored at maize yard because the 
mill's silos can only store 5,000 tonnes at a time. At the maize 
yard, bagged maize is stored outdoors under tarpaulins which is 
very expensive and creates high losses especially when in some 
cases the maize is stored for long periods. In order to avoid 
storing maize at the maize yard, Co-op Lesotho usually regulates 
the purchase of maize at the depots and this leads to 
dissatisfaction among farmers as they cannot sell maize when they 
wish to. Before 1982/83, farmers were not allowed to deliver 
maize directly to the maize mill but since that time they have 
been allowed to deliver directly to the mill and by-pass Co-op 
Lesotho. This came about as a result of government's policy 
that Co-op Lesotho undertake the marketing of FSSP output. This 
increased Co-op Lesotho's handling of maize from approximately
1,000 tonnes to 10,000 tonnes per season on the average 
(Ronsholt, 1984). This resulted in problems for Co-op Lesotho as 
it did not have suitable facilities for storing, grading and 
handling of such quantities and furthermore, no capital was 
provided to allow Co-op Lesotho to invest in the needed 
facilities. Wheat is delivered to the Lesotho Flour Mills (LFM) 
whici is located in Maseru. Only farmers with 8 bags and more 
can deliver directly to the LFM otherwise they have to market 
through Co-op Lesotho and traders.
2.2.2. Maize Marketing Channels
Maize marketing channels in Lesotho consist of farmers, area- 
based projects, maize mills, Co-op Lesotho, traders, wholesalers, 
retailers and consumers (Figure 2.1). Individual farmers can
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deliver maize directly to the mills or deliver to Co-op Lesotho 
and traders who then deliver to the mills. Usually farmers 
located nearer to the mills prefer to deliver maize directly to 
the mills while those located further away usually deliver to Co­
op Lesotho and traders. Area-based projects and traders can also 
deliver directly to the mills or Co-op Lesotho. Co-op Lesotho 
delivers maize to the mills and sometimes wholesalers and 
retailers buy maize from Co-op Lesotho. It is common for 
retailers to purchase maize from Co-op Lesotho and sell it in the 
Mountains where there is not much maize production because of 
climatic conditions.
The first maize mill in Lesotho was built in 1973. Before 1973, 
most of the maize produced in Lesotho was delivered to private 
traders who provided gristing services for a charge. Some of the 
maize was milled in RSA. The Lesotho Milling Company (LMC) began 
operations in 1973. It is owned by the Lesotho National 
Development Corporation (LNDC) which is a parastatal and Tiger 
Oats Company from the RSA. LMC annual milling capacity is 48,000 
tonnes while its storage capacity is 5,000 tonnes.
In 1974/75, LMC operated as an agent of PMC in importing maize 
and maize products. Under the Import of Maize and Maize Meal 
Regulations of 1975, PMC was pronounced as the sole importer of 
maize and maize products. Maize and maize products import 
control was undertaken because LMC operated below capacity as a 
result of competition from RSA milling companies and it was also 
found that significant guantities of degermed maize meal, which 
has .little nutritional value, were being imported into Lesotho. 
Under the import regulations, the importation of degermed maize 
meal was prohibited. Also under the regulations, anyone wishing 
to import maize and maize products had to apply to LMC. LMC 
first assessed if it could supply the applicant and if not the 
applicant was given an import permit to purchase maize and maize 
products in RSA. At present import permits are handled by the 
Department of Economics and Marketing of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
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The Maseru Roller Mills (MRM) has been gristing and distributing 
maize meal since the 1930s and has recently been expanded to mill 
maize meal. It is now a subsidiary of LMC. It has a storage 
capacity of 1,000 tonnes and its milling capacity is 3.5 tonnes 
per hour. The Lesotho Maize Mills (LMM) began operations in 1986. 
It is a subsidiary of the Lesotho Flour Mills (LFM). Its silos' 
storage capacity is 30,000 tonnes and its milling capacity is 
50,000 tonnes per annum.
At present LMC, MRM and LMM are the only importers of maize and 
maize products into Lesotho. Before the establishment of LMM and 
the expansion of MRM, LMC was only able to serve the lowlands 
districts. This means there was no maize and maize products 
import control in the mountain districts of Mokhotlong and Qachas 
Nek. Traders in Mokhotlong purchased maize meal in Natal while 
those in Qachas Nek purchased in Matatiele (Cape Province). In 
1988, maize and maize products import regulations began to cover 
the whole country and the three maize mills now supply the whole 
country including the mountain districts.
The examination of quantities of maize marketed through formal 
channels indicates that little quantities do so (Table 2.6). 
Marketing Sections (1983) concluded that on the average 6 to 7 
percent of the maize finds its way through formal marketing 
channels. The Monitoring and Evaluation Team (1985) estimated 
that in 1982, approximately 21 percent of the maize crop was 
marketed through formal marketing channels. It has been argued 
that 1982 was a "high water mark” in the percentage of maize 
marketed through formal channels as this was the year FSSP first 
marketed large quantities of maize.
Most of the locally produced maize purchased by the mills is 
delivered directly to the mills by farmers. For the three years
i.e. 1986-1988, MRM purchased 99 percent of the local maize 
directly from farmers while LMC purchased 95 percent. The 
situation is a bit different with LMM. In contrast to the other 
mills, it seems LMM purchases about equal amounts from farmers
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and Co-op Lesotho. For instance in 1988, it purchased 51 percent 
of the maize directly from farmers and 49 percent from Co-op 
Lesotho.
A large proportion of the maize produced in Lesotho is marketed 
during the months stretching from June to October (Table 2.6). 
This is because maize harvesting starts in May/June. Maize 
marketing continued to December in 1988 because large guantities 
were marketed and this resulted in Co-op Lesotho and some of the 
mills being unable to purchase all the maize because of 
inadeguate storage. In most instances farmers were told to wait 
for a few days/weeks before selling maize to either Co-op Lesotho 
or the mills. This has been a major complaint by farmers as they 
wish to sell their maize whenever they wish. The delays 
encountered in marketing maize leads to some farmers getting low 
prices because in Lesotho on-farm grain storage is a problem such 
that storing maize at the farm/home may lead to the maize being 
down-graded as a result of spoilage caused by insects, weather 
elements and rodents.
ible 2 .6 : Ouantities of Local Maize Purchased bv Mills (1985-
MONTH
1989) (Mt) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
January _ 201 93 69 561 59
February - 274 450 53 1896 38
March - 73 175 50 213 30
April - 167 22 27 156 19
May - 34 14 67 109 19
June 15 50 226 101 56 11
July 1167 1661 2900 1235 46
August 3784 3540 3336 7605 1226
September 1877 3988 1133 4007 1592
October 883 600 367 3622 216
November 245 216 233 2785 106
December 151 171 172 1515 68
Total 10975 9121 21136 6245
Source : Department of Economics and Marketing, MOA.
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2.2.3 Wheat: Marketing Channels
Wheat marketing channels also consist of farmers, area-based 
projects, the wheat mill, Co-op Lesotho, traders, wholesalers, 
retailers and consumers (Figure 2.2). In Lesotho there is winter 
and summer wheat. Winter wheat is grown in the Lowlands while 
summer wheat is grown in the Mountains. Individual farmers can 
deliver directly to the Lesotho Flour Mills (LFM) or deliver to 
Co-op Lesotho and traders who then deliver to LFM. Usually 
farmers located nearer to Maseru prefer to deliver wheat directly 
to the mill while those located further away from the mill 
usually deliver to Co-op Lesotho and traders. Area-based projects 
can also deliver directly to the mill or Co-op Lesotho.
Lesotho Flour Mills was established in 1979. It is owned by the 
Lesotho Government and operates as a parastatal under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. LFM is managed by consultants, Spillers 
Milling Company, from Britain. In addition to milling wheat and 
maize through LMM, it also operates a sugar packing plant and an 
animal feed mill. The capacity of the mill's silos is 40,000 
tonnes. LFM is the sole importer of wheat into Lesotho. Most 
of the wheat imported by LFM is from the RSA. Recently LFM has 
imported wheat form Spain, Argentina and Saudi Arabia (J. 
Mokotjo, Personal communication, December 1990).
LFM does not own delivery trucks, but contracts them locally 
whenever deliveries have to be made. For the mountain districts 
of Mokhotlong and Qachas Nek, LFM usually uses rail transport. 
For Mokhotlong the wheat meal is send by rail to Underberg 
(Natal) where it is then transported by road through the Sani 
Pass border post. For Qachas Nek the wheat meal is send by rail 
to Matatiele (Cape Province) where it is then transported by road 
to Qachas Nek.
LFM also handles donated wheat. The donated wheat is usually 
sold to LFM at market prices and the money is given to the Food 
Management Unit for its projects. In addition, LFM handles
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emergency food and the strategic food reserves. These are milled 
and some are held for emergencies.
3| The data for quantities of wheat purchased locally by LFM 
!I indicates that most of the wheat is delivered directly to the 
( mill by farmers (Table 2.7). The data also indicates that most 
1 of the wheat is marketed during the first 3 months of the year. 
c The implication of this is that most of the wheat marketed is 
f winter wheat which is harvested from December until January. The 
indication is that winter wheat is produced primarily as a cash 
crop while summer wheat is mainly produced as a subsistence crop. 
It is probable that summer wheat is mainly for subsistence 
because it is grown in the Mountains where there are a few 
marketing outlets such that farmers have nowhere to market the 
wheat.
Table 2.7: Ouantities of Local Wheat Purchased bv LFM (Mtl
Co-op Lesotho Farmers Total
1987
December - 74 74
1988
January _ 694 694February - 1162 1162March 163 _ 163April 100 _ 100May 36 - 36June - 73 73July 84 _ 84August - _
September 3 _ 3October 3 _ 3November _
December _
Total 389 1929 23l8
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Co-op Lesotho Fanners Total
1989
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
16
30
503
1547
500
378
334
114
73
36
503
1547
500
378
334
114
73
36
16
3000
Total 46 3485 3531
1990
January
February
March
April
May
June
593
295
78
51
50
34
593
295
78
51
50
34
Source: Department of Economics and Marketing, MOA
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Figure 2.2: Wheat Marketing Channels
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2.2.4 Sorghum Marketing Channels
Most of the sorghum produced in Lesotho is for subsistence and 
when traded goes through informal marketing channels. In 1982, 
0.1 percent of the sorghum was marketed through formal marketing 
channels (Monitoring and Evaluation Team, 1985). Nearly all the 
sorghum produced is used in the local brewing industry in making 
Joala. Co-op Lesotho is the most important formal marketing 
channel for sorghum. At present there is only one sorghum mill 
in the country while most of sorghum meal is ground at private 
traders' hammer mills. Co-op Lesotho has a sorghum malting plant 
in Maseru whereby sorghum is milled into sorghum meal using a 
hammer mill. The newly installed hammer mill's operating capacity 
is 8 bags/hour whereas the old one's operating capacity was 1.5 
bags/hour (Mrs. Takalimane, Personal communication, 8th March, 
1989).
Co-op Lesotho purchases sorghum from farmers and area-based 
projects (figure 2.3). It also imports sorghum from RSA if the 
local suppliers are not in a position to supply. Individuals, 
retailers and wholesalers can only import sorghum if Co-op 
Lesotho cannot supply them. Individual farmers, when not 
marketing through the informal marketing channels, market sorghum 
through traders and Co-op Lesotho. Traders then sell the sorghum 
in either milled or grain form to consumers.
The marketing season for sorghum is the same as maize as they 
are harvested at the same time. Data on the quantities of sorghum 
marketed through formal marketing channels is almost non­
existent. The only data available on sorghum purchases is from 
Co-op Lesotho. The problem with the data from Co-op Lesotho is 
that the amount of sorghum purchased by Co-op Lesotho in the 
years prior to 1987 are given in value terms only. In 1987/88 
Co-op Lesotho purchased 14.1 tonnes of sorghum from local farmers 
while in 1988/89 it purchased 1,068 tonnes.
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Figure 2.3; Sorghum Marketing Channels
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
LESOTHO GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEM
In attempting to analyse the performance of the Lesotho grain 
marketing system it is of importance to start by defining the 
terms used in the study. The most important being market 
performance which is dealt with in the first part of the chapter. 
The second part is on the development of performance measures 
applicable to the Lesotho grain marketing system.
3.1 Market Performance
Market participants, i.e consumers and farmers, are always
complaining about the performance of agricultural marketing 
systems. On the one hand, consumers usually complain about high 
and fluctuating food prices, and declining quality of farm 
produce. On the other hand, farmers complain about below-cost 
prices, high input costs, and the failure of retail and farm 
prices to move together. Farmers also complain about the lack of 
marketing facilities.
Market performance is a complex notion. Caves (1977, p. 67)
defines market performance as;
"the appraisal of how far the economic results of an 
industry's behaviour fall short of the best possible 
contribution it could make to achieving these (socio­
economic ) goals. "
In short market performance may be defined as how well the 
marketing system performs what society and market participants
expect of it. As can be seen from above, market participants
have conflicting goals. Farmers want high prices for their 
produce while consumers want low food prices. Market performance 
is concerned with the society in general. The society in general 
is concerned with socio-economic goals which are efficient uses 
of resources, full employment without unreasonable inflation,
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progressiveness and equity in distributing real output. Market 
performance is concerned with efficiency of the marketing system. 
Marketing efficiency consists of two aspects, which are referred 
to as operational (technical) and price efficiency.
3.1.1. Operational Efficiency
Operational efficiency is concerned with cost-reducing 
alternatives and technologies for physically providing marketing 
services. The individual marketing firm (or any other firm) is 
said to be operationally efficient if its production function 
yields the greatest output for any set of inputs, given its 
particular location and environment. In marketing, the physical 
functions are production, assembly, processing, transportation 
and storage. Within the marketing process the physical functions 
of assembly, processing, transport and storage add form, place 
and time utility to the product in question. The focus of 
operational efficiency is to provide the physical functions at 
minimum attainable cost of production. Thus operational 
efficiency is concerned with providing marketing services at the 
lowest cost given the factors of production (inputs) and with the 
use of the best available technology. Appropriate technology is 
that which given the structural, social, political and economic 
setting leads to lowest costs of providing marketing services.
3.1.2 Pricing Efficiency
Pricing efficiency criteria for a market are derived from the 
maximization of producer's plus consumer's surplus. Within a 
partial equilibrium framework consumer's surplus, the area to 
the left of the demand curve and above the purchase price 
provides a welfare measure. Producers' surplus, the area to the 
left of the supply curve and below the selling price, is quasi­
rent or the return to fixed inputs. The maximization of 
producer's plus consumer's surplus in a market yields the market 
equilibrium under perfect competition. The maximization of 
producer's plus consumer's surplus may be derived mathematically
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as follows:
Given the market demand and supply:
Qd = f(P) 3 •1
Q, = g(MC) 3.2
Where Qd = Quantity demanded 
Q, = Quantity supplied 
MC = Marginal cost.
P = Price
Consumer's and producer's surplus may be defined by
Consumer's Surplus (C.S) = (P) dQd - PQ 3.3
rQ*Producer's Surplus (P.S) = PQ - \ (MC) dQ. 3.4
Consumer's plus producer's surplus is maximized subject to the 
constraint that quantity supplied equals quantity demanded (Q, 
= Qd) and this is facilitated by using a Lagrangian function:
Max L = J ° d (P) dQd - (MC) dQs + ^ ( Q d  - Q.) 3.5
The first order conditions are:
6L = P + \ =  0 3.6
SQd
SL = MC - X= 0 3.7
6Q,
SL = Qd - Q. = 0 3 '8
Solving equations 3.6 and 3.7, the equilibrium condition results 
in
p = MC 3.9
Thus producer's plus consumer's surplus is maximized when the
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output price equals marginal cost (or input prices are equal 
to their marginal value product).
We expect a price efficient market to reflect transportation
over space, storage costs over time, and processing costs over
form. In addition the market is considered relatively price 
efficient if there is a smooth flow of information along 
marketing channels and participants are able to readily modify 
their allocation of resources in response to price signals.
Firms that are operationally efficient may not be price efficient 
if they fail to use inputs so that marginal revenue product is 
equal to factor prices (or marginal factor costs). For example, 
a monopolist in theory is operationally efficient, i.e. operates 
where the marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost but is not 
price efficient because the price of the output is not equal to 
its marginal cost. On the other hand a competitive firm is both
operationally and price efficient because producer's plus
consumer's surplus are maximized, i.e. the marginal cost of the 
output is equal to its marginal revenue and price.
3.2 Development of Performance Measures
In the field of market organization one of the most difficult 
problems is developing performance measures. The identification 
of relevant performance dimensions relies heavily on the goals 
of society. Usually wide variations exist between markets, some 
are less efficient than others. In trying to improve the 
performance of a market, a reference point or standard of 
measurement is needed. Performance standards are usually 
developed by reference to the expected performance of perfectly 
competitive markets which in real world departs from its 
theoretical ideal. The concept of perfect competitive market, 
despite its limitations acts as a useful directional aid in 
evaluating market situations. Williams and Stout (1964) argue 
that the perfectly competitive market can be compared to the 
North Star. One need never visit or even desire to go to the
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North Star to find that it is a useful navigational aid.
Firstly, it must be appreciated that the grain marketing system 
involves many participants. In the Lesotho grain marketing 
system the participants include farmers, consumers, the mills, 
marketing institutions and the government. Secondly, each group 
of participants has expectations and objectives about the grain 
marketing system and these objectives may in some cases be 
conflicting as previously mentioned with regard to farmers and 
consumers. Government is concerned with seeing to it that 
farmers, consumers and other market participants are satisfied 
by making regulations which have to be observed.
Martin (1980) proposes that in analyzing market performance, one 
should first start by specifying the expectations of market 
participants as generalized objectives. Secondly we should 
define a set of performance indicators that represent the various 
objectives. The final step is to specify a set of quantifiable 
measures that represent each of the performance measures and 
provide the basis for analysis. In developing performance 
measures applicable to the Lesotho grain marketing system 
Martin's approach is followed. The only problem with Martin's 
approach is that it applies to North America where the grain 
production system is efficient and well developed and farmers 
respond to market signals.
In developing performance measures applicable to the Lesotho 
grain marketing system, several problems were encountered. 
Lesotho agriculture can be said to be of subsistence nature which 
implies that very little quantities of grains are marketed 
through formal marketing channels. This poses a problem because 
subsistence farmers have multiple objectives on the grain 
marketing system which in most cases may prevail over the need 
to maximize profit in the Western sense. Government objectives 
with regard to the grain marketing system were obtained from the 
various Five Year Development Plans and Ministry of Agriculture 
(1988). In some cases the objectives were "made up" by the
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author on the basis of efficient marketing system theories. This 
means the objectives were based on what an efficient grain 
marketing system ought to provide. This may turn out to be 
inappropriate for Lesotho because in most cases efficient 
marketing system theories assume that farmers produce for the 
market which might not be the case in Lesotho as most farmers 
produce for subsistence.
The first objective of the Lesotho grain marketing system is to 
ensure adequate supply of grain for domestic requirements. The 
Government of Lesotho places a high priority to this objective 
as reflected in the Five Year Development Plans and public 
addresses and statements made by policy makers throughout the 
country. The objective of the government is to attain self- 
sufficiency in food grain production. The major reason for 
striving for self-sufficiency in food grain production is to 
guarantee food security and freedom from dependence on RSA. At 
present most of the commercial grain imports into Lesotho come 
from RSA. One way by which government has been trying to attain 
self-sufficiency in food grain production has been in the form 
of area-based development projects. The performance indicator of 
this objective is the level of self-sufficiency in food grain 
production and the quantifiable measures are:
(a) Trend and variation in local grain production,
(b) Trend and variation in grain imports, and
(c) Trend and variation in self-sufficiency in grain 
production.
The second objective which is closely related to the self- 
sufficiency objective is to encourage productivity in grain 
production. The first performance indicator for this objective 
is the level of productivity whose quantifiable measures are:
(a ) Trends in yields, and
(b) Research expenditure on new varieties of grains.
The second performance indicator is the availability of 
agricultural inputs whose quantifiable measure is the number of
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outlets selling inputs. The third performance indicator is the 
price of inputs whose quantifiable measure is the trend in input 
prices.
The third objective of the Lesotho grain marketing system is to 
encourage and promote production of grains. In this case it is 
assumed that producers respond to economic incentives in grain 
production. The first performance indicator of this objective 
is the level of grain producer prices and returns. The 
quantifiable measure is the trend in grain producer prices and 
price-cost margins. With regard to price-cost margins the 
question is whether grain production is profitable. The second 
performance indicator concerns stability of grain producer 
prices. In agriculture it is usually assumed that producers and 
consumers prefer price stability to instability.
The third performance indicator of this objective is market 
signals. In this case the concern is whether producers and other 
firms receive market signals in terms of what to produce, what 
quality and what quantity. The quantifiable measures for this 
indicator are:
(a ) Grading, and
(b ) Timing of producer prices announcements.
The other objective of the Lesotho grain marketing system is to 
organise the marketing of grain in the most efficient manner. 
This objective is concerned with the operational efficiency of 
the grain marketing system. Throughout history, several grain 
marketing systems have been tried in Lesotho. This was done in 
attempts to attain the most efficient grain marketing system. 
Operationally, a marketing system is considered efficient if it 
provides marketing services at the lowest cost. The marketing 
services include storage, transportation and processing. The 
characteristics of grain production and consumption are 
important.
The first performance indicator of this objective is least cost
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storage whose quantifiable measure are the different kinds of 
grain storage in place in Lesotho. Related to this is least cost 
grain transportation and grain processing. The second
performance indicator is concerned with the pricing of grains and 
grain products. The major question is whether prices are 
determined taking into consideration the storage, transportation 
and processing costs?
The other objective of the Lesotho grain marketing system is 
equity in marketing. Government policy is to carry out farm 
marketing as a public sector activity because traders in the 
past were seen to be exploitative and because of the need to 
maintain marketing services to remote communities which private 
traders may not maintain at a fair price. With regard to 
producers, the policy is to provide marketing services 
irrespective of their location. That is, a producer in the 
Mountains should get the same marketing services as a producer 
in the Lowlands. The quantifiable measure of producer equity 
in marketing is price variations amongst producers.
It is also government policy that consumers of grains and grain 
products be treated equitably. This means consumers should pay 
the same price of grains and grain products irrespective of their 
location in the country. The quantifiable measure for consumer 
equity is price variation amongst consumers of grains and grain 
products.
45
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LESOTHO GRAIN 
MARKETING SYSTEM
4.1. Adequate Supply of Food Grains
As indicated earlier the first objective of the grain marketing 
system is to ensure adequate supply of grain for domestic 
requirements. Lesotho's domestic grain requirements are made up 
of local production and imports. Grain imports are made up of 
commercial and donated imports.
4.1.1 Domestic Grain Production
One of the most important policies of the Lesotho Government is 
to attain self-sufficiency in food grain production. Self- 
sufficiency can be defined as achieving 100 percent of the staple 
food needs of a nation from domestic production and storage under 
all weather probabilities. The domestic production for the 
grains for the period 1973/74 to 1988/89 shows significant year 
to year variations. In the period 1973/74 to 1977/78, grain 
production was generally on the increase and reached peaks in 
1977/78. From 1978/79 grain production has generally been 
declining with a turn-a-round in 1984/85. Maize production 
reached record levels in 1988/89 mainly because of favourable 
weather. On the one hand the area planted to maize has been 
increasing since 1977/78 while the area planted to sorghum has 
stabilized around 60,000 ha. On the other hand the area planted 
to wheat has been declining for the period 1973/74 to 1985/86. 
The decline in area allocated to wheat is more pronounced in 
winter wheat than in summer wheat. In 1973/74, 48,00 ha were 
allocated to winter wheat and this declined to 8,000 ha in 
1985/86 - a 500 percent decline! The decline in both maize and 
sorghum production seems to be a result of declining yields which 
have been declining since 1976/77 (Table 4.3). The decline in 
wheat production seem to be mainly caused by both decline in area
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Several explanations have been put forth by analysts for the 
possible causes of the low food grain production in Lesotho. 
It has been suggested that the low grain production is due to 
the migration of men to RSA mines (Eckert et al, 1982 and 
Marketing Sections, 1983). It is argued that the absence of 
able bodied men results in reduced labour input in agriculture. 
It is also argued that many families depend on mine remittances 
and as a result are less dependent on farming as a means of 
subsistence and hence have less incentive to engage seriously in 
agricultural production.
One other possible cause of the low food grain production are 
natural calamities like weather and pests. In the early 1980s 
Lesotho and the whole region of Southern Africa experienced 
drought which affected grain production. Pests, e.g. locusts 
and cut-worm, have also contributed in part to the low 
production. In some years, e.g. 1975/76, production was low 
mainly because of excessive rains during the harvesting period.
The other possible cause of the low grain production is the 
decline in soil fertility caused by soil erosion and 
overstocking. Soil erosion remain one of the very serious 
problem facing Lesotho. Every year thousands of tonnes of the 
top soil are washed away by rains and this results in low soil 
fertility which in turn affects yields. Soil erosion is also 
caused by overgrazing. It has been estimated that Lesotho is 
300 percent overstocked. Overstocking causes overgrazing which 
results in land degradation and ultimately soil erosion. Gully 
erosion which causes dongas also contributes to the decline in 
arable land.
From 1970 to 1977 land under cultivation decreased by 22 percent 
and has since stabilized. Recently population pressure has led 
to agricultural producing areas being turned into residential
planted to wheat and yields which both show a downward trend for
the period covered.
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areas. This is more pronounced in peri-urban areas of Maseru, 
Maputsoe and Thota-Moli. The encroachment of residential areas 
on arable land has meant decreased land suitable for cultivation.
It has been argued that the introduction of fast maturing hybrid 
seeds has led to farmers planting too late. In most cases crops 
that are planted too late do not mature because of frost. Late 
planting is also caused by some farmers having no livestock to 
plough. From 1970 to 1980 the proportion of rural households 
without livestock increased from 38 percent to 47 percent. This 
means more people have to rely on other peoples livestock for 
ploughing. Late planting may also be caused by the labour 
migration system whereby the women left behind cannot make 
decisions as to what crops to plant because they have to consult 
with their husbands in the mines. This may not be a serious 
problem nowadays because the husbands come home freguently during 
week ends and holidays.
It has also been argued that the land tenure system does not 
provide farmers with security of tenure and as a result farmers 
do not invest in land. According to the land law of Lesotho, a 
farmer can have a field confiscated if a field is left follow for 
three years. It is claimed that some farmers are more interested 
in retaining the right to land than in producing from it.
The Marketing Section of MOA (1983) lists three possible causes 
of the declining planted area to winter wheat production. All 
the reasons relate to CCPP which grew winter wheat in the 
Lowlands. It is argued that farmers saw how much better crops 
could be when produced under CCPP's high input technology and got 
discouraged from planting as many hectares of winter wheat as 
they used to with their traditional methods. Hence when CCPP 
experienced problems farmers did not revert to growing wheat on 
their own. Under CCPP, combine harvesters were taken to rural 
areas and farmers found them to be a great improvement over 
traditional methods. In most cases CCPP did all the tasks from
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ploughing up to threshing which it could afford because it was 
highly subsidised and when it ceased operations farmers could not 
continue with wheat production at the same level as CCPP. It can 
be argued that farmers are no longer interested in wheat 
production and as a result have ceased growing wheat and resorted 
to growing maize hence the increasing area allocated to maize 
production.
Some of the possible causes of declining grain production are 
related to marketing. It is possible that with the reduced number 
of marketing outlets farmers were discouraged from producing 
grain. The frequent changing of marketing institutions may have 
also led to farmers being discouraged from producing grain. 
Sometimes there have been confusion in the pricing system 
between Lesotho and RSA. Sometimes prices in Lesotho have been 
set too high relative to those prevailing in RSA and this makes 
it difficult for marketing agencies to dispose of the produce. 
Marketing agencies in some cases cease or temporarily stop 
purchasing produce rather than face losing money. Sometime prices 
in Lesotho have set too low relative to prices in RSA and this 
leads to farmers to withhold thier produce or smuggle it across 
to RSA.
4.1.2 Grain Imports
The domestic production of grains does not meet the total 
requirements such that grain has to be imported to meet the 
shortfall. Grain imports are in the form of commercial and 
donated. Commercial imports are mostly from RSA. Lesotho is 
treated as a domestic buyer by RSA because she belongs to both 
the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetary 
Area (CMA). This ensures Lesotho of supplies even if RSA has to 
import either maize or wheat. Also Lesotho benefits from the fact 
that RSA marketing boards' selling prices are normally fixed for 
a year and do not take account of storage costs which are met by 
subsidies from RSA Government. Because supplies of maize and
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wheat are reliable and the storage costs are subsidised there is 
no incentive for Lesotho to seek other sources of supply or to 
hold large quantities of maize and wheat. The major disadvantage 
of relying on one country for imports is that when relations 
between the two countries get worse, supplies may be cut and the 
other country has to start looking for other sources of supply. 
Donated imports are from western countries, private organisations 
and United Nations agencies. The major western countries which 
donate food grains to Lesotho include the USA, Canada, and the 
EEC while private agencies include Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) . The UN agencies include the World Food Programme (WFP) and 
others. There are no donated sorghum imports. The Government 
of Lesotho has recently announced that donated imports will be 
restricted.
Total imports of maize and wheat have generally been increasing. 
From 1973/74 to 1981/82 wheat imports stabilized around 34,000 
tonnes per year but from thereon started increasing (Table 4.1). 
Since 1979/80 maize imports have exceeded domestic production 
such that imports now constitute over 50 percent of the total 
maize supply. The same phenomenon has been observed with regard 
to wheat. At present wheat imports constitute around 80 percent 
of the total wheat supply.
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Table 4.1 ; Total Supply of Food Grains in Lesotho (OOOmt).
1973/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86
Domestic
Production
Maize 112.5 70.3 49.1 125. 9 143.2 124.9 105.6 105. 7 83.0 76.2 79.4 92.4 86.5
Wheat 57.0 45.3 44.6 61.4 57.9 33.6 28.2 17.0 14.5 14.8 17.1 18.4 11.0
Sorghum 84.0 37.4 24.5 62.3 85.8 69.0 59.3 47.7 26.0 30.7 33.8 54.8 33.6
Commercial
Imports
Maize 60.1 62.7 76.4 77.0 85.3 83.0 95.7 102.0 87.2 94.9 99.8 102.3 97.9
Wheat 31.3 32.0 31.2 35.7 30.8 31.5 30.3 23.9 22.0 31.8 32.0 32.0 32.0
Sorghum 7.1 3.1 5.1 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.7 3.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
Donated
Imports
Maize 7.3 11.8 6.7 5.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 15.0 12.0 9.0 9.0 15.0 15.0
Wheat 1.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.3 6.9 7.4 6.4 11.8 20. 6 26.6 30.7 31.0
Sorghum - - - - - - — — -
Total
Imports
Maize 67.4 74.5 83.1 82.0 91.3 91.0 105.7 117.0 99.2 103.9 108.8 117.3 112.9
Wheat 32.3 33.8 32.7 36.8 32.1 38.4 37.7 30.3 33.8 52.4 58.6 62.7 63.0
Sorghum 7.1 3.1 5.1 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.7 3.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
Total
Supply
Maize 189.9 144.8 132.2 207.9 234.5 215.9 211.3 222.7 182.2 180.1. 188.2 209.7 199.4
Wheat 89.3 79.1 77.3 98.2 90.0 72.0 65.9 47.3 48.3 67.2 75.7 81.1 74.0
Sorcrhum 91.1 41.1 29.6 64.2 87.6 70.4 60.3 49.4 29.3 32.0 34.8 55.8 34.6
Source: Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture (Various Years)
4.1.3 Food Grains Self-sufficiency
Because of the low productivity and declining grain production, 
Lesotho is not self-sufficient in food grain production. Self- 
sufficiency is taken to be total domestic production divided by 
total supply which consists of total domestic production and 
imports. Lesotho is almost self-sufficient in sorghum. Sorghum 
self-sufficiency ratio is around 95 percent for the years 
1973/74-1988/89 (Table 4.2). In maize and wheat production, 
Lesotho is not self-sufficient. Since 1977/78, Lesotho self- 
sufficiency in both maize and wheat show a sustained downward 
trend. Maize self-sufficiency was at a peak in 1973/74 and at 
the lowest in 1975/76. Since 1980/81, maize self-sufficiency has 
been around 44 percent which means 56 percent of the total maize 
supply is imported.
Wheat self-sufficiency also shows a downward trend like maize. 
Since 1982/83 wheat self-sufficiency has been around 20 percent 
which means about 80 percent of the total wheat supply is 
imported. It seems Lesotho's self-sufficiency in food grains 
will decline further. This is because food grain production 
shows a declining trend and at the same time Lesotho population 
is increasing rapidly. From 1976 to 1986, the annual population 
growth rate is 2.8 percent as opposed to 2.6 percent between 1966 
and 1976. The increasing population and low grain production 
mean that Lesotho will increasingly rely more on imports.
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Table 4.2; Food Grains Self-Sufficiency in Lesotho (Percent:)
Year Maize Wheat Sorqhum
1973/74 65 64 97
1974/75 49 58 98
1975/76 37 58 83
1976/77 61 63 83
1977/78 61 64 98
1978/79 49 44 97
1979/80 48 47 98
1980/81 43 43 98
1981/82 48 36 97
1982/83 46 30 89
1983/84 42 22 96
1984/85 42 23 97
1985/86 44 23 98
1986/87 43 15 97
1987/88 42 18 90
1988/89 53 20 98
Averaqe 48 39 95
Source: Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture 
(Various Years)
4.2 Productivity
4.2.1 Grain Yields
Productivity in food grain production is measured as output per 
unit area e.g. kgs/ha, kgs/ac or lbs/ac. In Lesotho kgs/ac and 
Kgs/ha are the most commonly used measures of productivity. As 
mentioned earlier evidence suggests that productivity in food 
grain production is one of the major causes of the low 
production. The average yields for maize, sorghum and wheat are 
785 kgs/ha, 801 kgs/ha respectively for the years 1973/74 to 
1985/86. The yields realised in Lesotho compare unfavourably 
with the yields realised in RSA. The average yields in RSA for 
maize, sorghum and wheat are 2,000 kgs/ha, 1,900 kgs/ha and 
l,000kgs/ha respectively for the period 1974/75 to 1983/84 while 
in Swaziland the average maize yields are 1,300 kgs/ha (FAO, 
1984) .
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Evidence suggests that productivity is the major cause of the 
poor and declining grain production. The causes of the low 
productivity have been pointed to weather and poor management 
practices. The low productivity may also be caused by 
inappropriate agronomic practices which include inadeguate land 
preparation, late weeding, lower seeding rates which results in 
lower plant population density and low fertilizer applications. 
Research has shown that grain yields can be increased 
significantly if farmers use hybrid seeds, and plant at the right 
time. Research undertaken at the Research Division of MOA over 
the last two years show that the average maize yields are 3,000-
4,000 kgs/ha (Massey, 1989). The other finding from fields in the 
Lowlands and Foothills is that hybrid maize yields 50-100 percent 
more grain than open pollinated or saved seed.
Table 4.3 : Average Grain Yields in Lesotho (Kqs/ha^
Year Maize Sorcrhum Wheat
1973/74 869 991 694
1974/75 556 547 714
1975/76 425 443 748
1976/77 1,359 1,331 1,397
1977/78 1,284 1,383 1,269
1978/79 1,021 1,274 885
1979/80 892 919 919
1980/81 774 749 721
1981/82 608 446 536
1982/83 601 539 465
1983/84 573 540 511
1984/85 637 672 427
1985/86 611 585 423
1986/87 569 397 631
1987/88 842 691 729
Averaqe 775 767 738
Source: Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture 
(Various Years)
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4.2.2 Research Kxpenditure on Grains
The Research Division of MOA is mandated to undertake 
agricultural research in the country. Agricultural research in 
the country began in 1952 with the establishment of the Maseru 
Experimental Farm which is presently the Research Division of 
MOA. The Research Division undertakes crop trials to ascertain 
if the seeds are suitable for Lesotho conditions. The results are 
disseminated to farmers through extension agents.
Most of the new varieties of grains grown in Lesotho are imported 
from RSA. In RSA, there are private seed companies which 
undertake research on development of new grain varieties. It is 
usually claimed that the climatic conditions in the RSA are 
almost the same as those in Lesotho such that the new seed 
varieties being developed in RSA should do well in Lesotho. In 
some cases RSA seed companies develop seed varieties for Lesotho 
conditions. For instance, the Highland maize is specifically 
suited for the mountain region because it requires a shorter 
growing period. One major problem with the imported seeds is that 
the hybrid seeds are bred in a country where fertilizer is always 
available and applied as recommended. Such hybrid seeds respond 
well to fertilizer but yield poorly when it is not applied. 
Basotho farmers do not apply the recommended fertilizer rates. 
In most cases fertilizer application rates are low and are only 
about half of the recommended rates (FAO, 1980). The Ministry 
of Agriculture's Research Division runs a soil testing 
laboratory. After the soil is tested, farmers are given the 
recommended lime, fertilizer and manure rates to be applied. The 
soil analysis costs M2.00 and M10.00 per sample for farmers and 
projects respectively.
The only controlled seed production in Lesotho was carried out 
by the Wheat Seed Multiplication Unit (WSMU) of MOA which was 
started in 1967. The WSMU contracted with individual growers, 
associations or small farmers to grow about 490 tonnes of an RSA
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winter wheat variety. The WSMU is no longer in operation. At 
present Seed Multiplication Unit of the Department of Crops does 
a limited seed multiplication. Plans are underway to establish 
a hybrid maize seed production and processing plant in Lesotho. 
The plant will be a joint venture between the LNDC, the Pioneer 
Hi-bred International Company from the USA and Agrivet which is 
a local company involved in the distribution of seeds (Molefi, 
1989).
4.2.3 Availability of Inputs
The major inputs required in the production of grains are seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides and implements such as ox-ploughs, 
planters and yokes. Most of the inputs are imported from RSA 
although some of the implements are manufactured in Lesotho e.g 
The Thaba Khupa Ecumenical Centre and Lesotho Steel manufacture 
a limited range of agricultural implements. Before government 
intervention in the agricultural marketing system, traders sold 
both agricultural inputs and implements. Traders ceased dealing 
in agricultural inputs around 1973/74. After this period the 
marketing of inputs became the responsibilities of PMC and Co­
op Lesotho. Traders now sell mostly agricultural implements. 
Recently private concerns selling agricultural inputs have been 
established in Mafeteng, Maseru, Maputsoe and Hlotse. Co-op 
Lesotho has just over 40 depots and there are approximately six 
concerns handling agricultural inputs which means there are 
nearly 50 outlets selling inputs in the country. Under the 
Agricultural Input Distribution Reform component of the Lesotho 
Agricultural Policy Support Programme (LAPSP) financed by the 
USAID, the Lesotho Government encourages the private sector 
including individuals, associations and farmers' co-operatives 
to participate in a free and competitive market system for 
agricultural inputs (Mirror, 1989).
Evidence suggests that since 1973/74 there has been a decline 
in the number of outlets selling agricultural inputs but to what 
extent this has affected grain production is not known. Evidence
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from surveys undertaken in the early 1980s indicate that the 
availability of inputs was not a major difficulty facing farmers. 
Farmers indicated lack of money to purchase inputs as being their 
major difficulty (Wyeth and Moletsane, 1984a). At present it 
seems the major complaint from farmers is that in most instances 
inputs are not available at the right time from Co-op Lesotho 
depots and that when available are expensive.
Fertilizer and seed prices are variable from year to year (Table 
4.4). This is because in some years fertilizer and seed prices 
are subsidized and in some they are not. The fertilizer and seed 
subsidy scheme has been in operation since 1963. The purpose of 
the subsidy scheme has been to encourage increased use of 
fertilizers and improved seed by making them available to farmers 
at approximately factory prices (Tarbox, 1979). The fertilizer 
subsidy was financed through the FAO International Fertilizer 
Supply Scheme and the Overseas Development Mission (ODM). The 
fertilizer subsidy was divided into two parts. The first being 
price subsidy and the second being a transport subsidy intended 
to equalize the internal delivery costs and to keep the price 
uniform throughout the country (Tarbox, 1979). Agricultural 
implements prices are generally on the increase. This is because 
they are not subsidized like fertilizer and seeds.
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Table 4.4 : Selected Input Prices (Maloti)
Maize Seed (kg)
Wheat Seed (kg)
Sorghum Seed (kg) 0.16 
Saifos (50kg)
3:2:0 (50kg)
Plough 
Planter 
Harrow 
Ox -Cart 
Thiodan 
Spade 
Sickle
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
0.19 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.25 1.25 1.00
0.16 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.520.20 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.62 0.50
7.30 7.50 11.78 15.00 11.00 12.30 11.82 9.88 12.72
8.75 _ 12.00 15.00 11.13 14.51 16.19 12.34 15.00
31.50 34.00 43.00 49.00 150.00 - 110.95 118.38 122.80
00.00 138.00 195.00 155.00 177.50 200.00 312.52 334.30 333.44_ 90.00 95.00 _ _ 78.47 78.47 81.38
_ _ _ _ 3.00 426.00 481.65 536.92 652.82
2.25 2.50 2.70 3.15 4.00 _ - 6.50 7.85
5.10 5.40 6.90 9.30 7.99 8.73 10.25 10.13 11.38
1.20 2.00 1.72 2.10 2.52 3.02 2.43 2.70 3.00
Source: Bureau of Statistics (Various years).
4.3 Encourage Production of Grains
4.3.1 Producer Prices
Since the mid-1970's cost-plus pricing has been the approach 
followed in Lesotho in the pricing of grains. By cost-plus 
pricing is meant that all production costs which usually include 
ploughing, discing, planting, cultivating and hoeing (not for 
wheat), seed, fertilizers, chemicals, bags and twines, transport 
and interests on costs. The resulting figure is divided by the 
estimated crop yield (kg/ha or kg/acre) to arrive at production 
costs per bag or tonne. A percentage margin is then added to the 
production costs per bag or tonne to arrive at the producer 
price. The percentage margin is to provide the farmer with his 
profit. The practice in Lesotho has been to give farmers a 
margin of between 5 and 20 percent. Usually when production is 
poor, the margin is set higher and when production is relatively
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poor, the margin is set higher and when production is relatively 
good, the margin is set lower.
The Crops Division of the MOA used to collect production costs 
and later the Farming Systems Research Project based in the 
Research Division of MOA collected production costs at Nyakosoba 
(Foothills), Siloe (Lowlands) and Molumong (Mountains). The FSSP 
(TOU) has also provided production costs estimates which are 
considered to be representative of those incurred by farmers 
producing for the commercial market. The costs incurred by 
subsistence farmers using traditional technology are not well 
documented.
Cost-plus pricing was abandoned in the early 1980s, because of 
several reasons. The first reason is that because of Lesotho's 
dependence on RSA for food imports, the pricing system followed 
in RSA has a great impact on Lesotho pricing systems. If Lesotho 
producer prices and hence consumer prices are higher than those 
prevailing in the RSA, smuggling of grain products across the 
border is encouraged. RSA producers smuggle grain into Lesotho 
where they can get better prices and Lesotho traders smuggle the 
cheaper RSA maize/wheat meal into Lesotho. If Lesotho producer 
prices are lower than RSA's, Lesotho farmers smuggle produce 
across the border into RSA where they can get relatively higher 
prices. Traders also smuggle the cheaper Lesotho grain products 
into RSA. The other reason is that production costs have been 
increasing at a very fast rate because of inflation. If cost- 
plus pricing is followed it means producer prices and hence 
consumer prices will have to move in line with the inflation 
rate. For instance in 1984/85 RSA maize producers presented 
M500/tonne as being their production costs. This could have 
serious implications for consumer prices. Cost-plus pricing has 
been replaced by import parity pricing.
By import parity pricing is meant that the domestic producer 
price is set equal to that of some selected market. In the case
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of Lesotho, the selected market is RSA for obvious reasons3. For 
imported products, the Lesotho producer price is RSA boards' 
selling prices plus transport and handling charges to Lesotho. 
This is called import parity pricing. For exported produce e.g. 
beans and peas, the Lesotho producer price is RSA prices minus 
transportation and handling charges from Lesotho to RSA. During 
the period of private traders handling grains i.e. before 1974, 
Lesotho grain prices moved in line with RSA prices. With regard 
to maize, import parity pricing was followed while with wheat 
export parity pricing was followed. Export parity pricing was 
followed for wheat because even though Lesotho imported large 
quantities of wheat there was no wheat mill in the country such 
that the wheat was exported and imported later in milled form.
The major advantage of import parity pricing is that problems 
of controlling illegal product movements across the borders are 
eliminated. The major disadvantage is that it assumes no 
disparity of costs of production and yield levels which is not 
the case. RSA yield levels tend to be higher than Lesotho's. 
The other reason is that the practice in RSA has been to set 
agricultural produce prices above world prices as a way of 
encouraging self-sufficiency in agriculture and because of import 
parity pricing policy Lesotho has to follow the high RSA prices. 
Recently RSA agricultural prices have been at par or lower than 
world prices mainly because of the weakening Rand against the 
major currencies of the world.
Since RSA has a considerable impact on the agricultural pricing 
system of Lesotho it is of interest to briefly outline the grain 
pricing system in that country. The pricing system for maize, 
wheat and sorghum in the RSA are the same. The main feature of 
the RSA agricultural marketing system is that it is board 
controlled. There are over 20 agricultural marketing boards in 
RSA. This means that RSA agricultural marketing system is single­
3Botswana and Swaziland also follow import parity pricing 
ex the RSA.
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channel system. By single-channel marketing system is meant 
producers, usually located in controlled areas, have to market 
through a marketing board and nowhere else. The RSA Maize Board 
used to handle maize and sorghum but recently sorghum is now 
handled by the newly established Sorghum Board. Nearly 95 percent 
of the maize crop is produced in what is known as area "A" which 
comprises Transvaal, Orange Free State, certain districts of 
Natal and Cape Province. Producers in area "A” are prohibited 
from selling to anyone but the Maize Board. Area "B” comprises 
certain districts encompassing the urban areas of Natal and Cape 
Province where producers may sell their maize to registered 
traders who in turn can sell it on their own account at prices 
which cannot be less than producer prices in area "A”. Producers 
in the rest of the country can market their crop any way they 
wish. Wheat is handled by the Wheat Board. Most of the wheat 
produced in RSA is from the western Cape Province and the Orange 
Free State.
Each grain has a producer association e.g. for maize the producer 
association is the National Maize Producers Organization (NAMPO). 
Producer organizations first make price recommendations which are 
passed on to the National Marketing Council (NMC) which 
coordinates the activities of all marketing boards in RSA. The 
NMC has production costs collected from a sample of farmers and 
uses this data together with the submissions from the boards and 
producer organizations to arrive at its own price 
recommendations. The NMC's price recommendations are passed on 
to Cabinet which is the ultimate decision maker. In arriving at 
producer prices, the Cabinet has to take into consideration 
economic and political factors. It also takes into consideration 
production in other countries, world prices, etc. Thus the price 
recommendations start from producers where only producers' 
interests are considered and move up to the Cabinet where the 
society's interests are considered. After Cabinet arrives at the 
producer price, it is gazetted and remain in force for one 
season. Maize and sorghum prices are usually set in May while 
wheat prices are set around October/November.
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After RSA announces producer prices, the agricultural pricing 
machinery in Lesotho is set in motion. For maize and sorghum, 
producer prices are determined in May after RSA's price 
announcements. The Agricultural Pricing Committee which consists 
of representatives from the mills, Co-op Lesotho, farmers in each 
district, Crops, Research and Economics and Marketing Departments 
of the MOA and chaired by the Principal Secretary MOA meet to 
determine Lesotho producer prices. The Principal Secretary then 
advises the Minister of Agriculture who then presents the 
recommended prices to Cabinet. The Lesotho producer price is 
equal to RSA marketing boards' selling price plus transportation 
and handling charges to the mills (Maseru and Maputsoe).. This 
provides the landed price of imported grain at the mills, and 
producer price for farmers marketing directly to the mills. For 
farmers marketing through Co-op Lesotho the price is the millgate 
price minus Co-op Lesotho handling charges. Prior to 1987/88 the 
committee used to also determine wholesale and retail prices of 
grain products. In 1987/88, the Ministry of Agriculture 
suggested that the retail prices should be gazetted by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The producer, wholesale and 
retail prices are gazetted and remain in force for one season 
i.e. from May until April/May the following year for maize and 
sorghum and from October/November, until September/October the 
following year for wheat.
When cost-plus pricing was practised, Lesotho producer prices 
tended to be lower than RSA's (Table 4.5). Lesotho maize and 
wheat producer prices started being higher than RSA's when import 
parity pricing was followed. Lesotho sorghum prices have been 
higher than RSA's since 1977 and the difference between two 
countries sorghum prices is more pronounced than in maize and 
wheat.
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Table 4.5: Lesotho and RSA Grain Producer Prices (M/tonne)
Maize Sorghum Wheat
Lesotho RSA Lesotho RSA Lesotho RSA
Year
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
49.33 
49 .00
55.00 
64 .50
72.00 
106.00
109.00
133.00 
175.79
191.00
229.00
256.85
279.86 
320.53 
343.60
356.01 
385.00
57.00
62.00
65.00
65.00
73.00 
79.90
100.15
118.25
118.25 
134.05
167.55
218.55 
218.60 
240.35
215.00
240.00
212.00
62.00
55.00
65.00 
72.14
79.00
107.00
115.00 
123.09 
175.85 
175.52
200.00 
220.60 
239.71
249.00
294.00
303.00 
314.25
55.22
71.01
73.19 
81.04
75.20 
83.71 
90.63 
94.77
153.07
119.96
148.00 
177.33
174.00 
187.05
182.00
172.00
195.00
61.18
77.00
104.86 
108.14 
114.29
123.00
180.00 
208.74
258.57 
279.61
300.58 
330.43 
339.00 
390.60 
439.04
461.86
95.60
102.74
117.94
117.94 
132.09 
179.44 
208.54 
233.16
265.75
285.75
265.75 
289.03 
312.25 
347.70 
383.15 
339.50
Source: Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture
(Various Years)
Table 4.6 below presents Lesotho gazetted grain prices with
inflationary impacts removed (1975 = 100). The prices were
deflated by the Lesotho consumer price index. The deflated 
prices flatten out through the period covered. They essentially 
indicate that when inflationary impacts are removed grain prices 
have not increased but remained almost the same. Deflated grain 
prices seem to have reached highs in the drought years of 1982- 
1984 when production was low but have since then been on the
decline as production returned to normality.
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Table 4.6; Lesotho Gazetted Grain Prices (Constant 
Maloti/tonne ^
(1975 = 100)
YEAR MAIZE SORGHUM WHEAT
1973/74 64 .06 80.52 79.45
1974/75 55.94 62.79 87.90
1975/76 55.00 65.00 104.86
1976/77 58.32 65.23 97.78
1977/78 55.35 60.72 87.85
1978/79 74.18 74.88 86.07
1979/80 62.79 66.24 103.69
1980/81 67.00 62.01 105.16
1981/82 77 .71 77.95 114.31
1982/83 75.94 69.79 111.18
1983/84 78.83 68.85 103.47
1984/85 81.18 69.72 104.43
1985/86 88.45 64.28 90.91
Source: Own calculations.
It was earlier pointed out that most of the grain produced in 
Lesotho is marketed in the informal market. Informal market 
prices for maize and sorghum tend to be higher than formal market 
prices while informal wheat prices tend to be lower than formal 
prices (Table 4.7). It can be argued that informal maize and
sorghum prices are relatively higher because of excess demand 
over supply whereas for wheat it is the opposite. This is 
because wheat is considered a luxury while maize and sorghum are 
the staples. Formal maize meal prices tend to be higher than 
informal maize meal prices. The higher price of formal maize 
meal and the lower cost of maize from hammer/roller mills 
provides a powerful incentive for a consumer to buy a neighbour's 
maize and have it gristed. Besides cost, freshness is said to 
be a factor influencing choice of locally gristed sifted maize 
meal especially for people isolated from the formal market but 
living where maize gristing services are available (Olson, 1985). 
Also maize and sorghum grains are widely stored in the homes 
because they keep better than meal. Traditional attitudes, 
habits and consumer preferences are also a factor. For example, 
it is claimed that people from the Mountain region prefer
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unsifted to sifted maize meal. It can be argued that informal 
wheat prices tend to be lower than formal prices because most of 
the hammer/roller mills grist only maize and sorghum and this may 
have resulted in informal wheat market not being in existence.
In comparing gazetted (formal) and informal grain prices they 
tend to move together (Tables 4.5 and 4.7). During the drought 
years of 1980 - 1982, informal grain prices increased rapidly. 
Informal maize prices increased by 43 percent, sorghum by 120 
percent and wheat by 67 percent between 1980/81 and 1981/82. 
Informal prices seem to have reached peaks in 1981/82 because 
since then they are on the decline. As informal prices are 
declining and formal prices increasing the gap between them is 
closing and it seems very soon formal maize and sorghum prices 
will be higher than informal.
Table 4.7; Annual Average Informal Market Grain Prices 
(M/tonne)
Year Maize Sorahum Wheat
1973/74 _ _ -
1974/75 58.91 74.28 70.80
1975/76 59.50 78.74 76.32
1976/77 70.00 70.00 90.00
1977/78 80.00 90.00 100.00
1978/79 90.00 100.00 130.00
1979/80 100.00 120.00 140.00
1980/81 140.00 150.00 180.00
1981/82 200.00 330.00 300.00
1982/83 200.00 210.00 240.00
1983/84 190.00 200.00 250.00
Source: Bureau of Statistics (various years)
4.3.2 Returns From Grain Production
Grain production costs incurred in the 1970's are not available. 
They started being available in the 1980's but in the years 
between 1984/85 - 1986/87 there were no production costs
collected. The rationale for stopping to collect them was that 
they were not being used in the determination of producer prices.
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The collection of production costs was resumed in 1987/88 and 
this time they are collected by farmers with the help of district 
agricultural offices. The Department of Economics and Marketing 
of MOA is in a process of standardising the collection of 
production costs in the country.
Table 4.8: Average Grain Production Costs (M/Tonne)
Year
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84-86/87
1987/88
1988/98
1989/90_______
Maize
150.59
310.45
442.42
368.68
390.00
Sorghum
154.35
234.73
Wheat
226.37
215.43
366.40 
454.42
Source: Plath J.C. (1982), Holland and Tsiu (1983), and
Department of Economics and Marketing
In order to ascertain whether farmers are making profits form 
grain production, price-cost margins are presented. The price- 
costs margins are obtained by subtracting production costs (Tab3.e 
4.8) from producer prices (Table 4.5). Price-cost margins tend 
to be negative for both maize and sorghum and positive for wheat 
(Table 4.9). Negative price-cost margins indicate losses while 
positive price-cost margins indicate positive returns.
Table 4.9: Grain Price-Cost Margins (M/tonne^
Year Maize Sorghum Wheat
1980/81 -17 -31.26 -17.63
1981/82 - - 43.14
1982/83 -119.45 -58.88
1983/84-86/87 - -
1987/88 -98.82 - 72.64
1988/89 -12.67 - 7.44
1989/90____________-5.00__________-_________________ -
Source: Own calculations
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4.3.3 Marketing Margins
A marketing margin is the difference in the price paid at two 
different points in the marketing system. In the case of the 
Lesotho grain marketing system we are interested in the 
difference in the price paid to farmers marketing through Co-op 
Lesotho and the millgate producer price. This difference is Co­
op Lesotho handling charges. Only Co-op Lesotho's handling 
charges will be examined because it is difficult to determine the 
marketing costs incurred by farmers marketing directly to the 
mills. Maize and wheat marketing margins will be considered 
although wheat marketing margins have just recently been 
gazetted. Co-op Lesotho marketing costs include: labour,
transport, loss due to breakage, theft and weather elements, 
fumigation, insurance, depreciation on storage facilities and 
interest on short term loans.
Co-op Lesotho usually works out marketing costs and presents 
them to the Pricing Committee when prices are being determined. 
The committee has the right to reject Co-op Lesotho's submission. 
For example in 1984/85 season, Co-op Lesotho estimated that its 
maize marketing costs per tonne was M40.55 but this was rejected 
and M21.00 was agreed to as Co-op Lesotho's marketing costs. The 
same thing happened in 1989/90 when Co-op Lesotho recommneded 
M42.85 as its marketing costs but this was rejected and M35.99 
was agreed to. It should be noted that Co-op Lesotho's marketing 
costs have an impact on the price received by farmers marketing 
through Co-op Lesotho.
Co-op Lesotho handling charges fluctuate from year to year 
because the Pricing Committee in most cases reject Co-op 
Lesotho's handling charges submissions. This means Co-op Lesotho 
incurs losses in handling grains which are usually made up by 
government subsidy. For example in 1988 the government had to 
subsdise Co-op Lesotho with nearly M6 . 2 million. Maize marketing 
costs tend to be higher than wheat marketing costs even though 
wheat producer prices tend to be higher than maize producer
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prices. Wheat marketing costs consist of mostly transport costs 
whereas maize has to be stored, fumigated and insured. Also with 
maize, Co-op Lesotho usually borrows money froir the commercial 
banks on short-term basis. Short-term loans are much expensive 
as the interest rates are much higher than long term loans. 
Because Co-op Lesotho handles small quantities of wheat produced 
locally, LFM can purchase and store all of it.
Table 4.10: Co-op Lesotho Maize and Wheat Marketing Costs
(M/tonne)
Year Maize Wheat
1980/81 _ _
1981/82 19 .84 _
1982/83 21.00 -
1983/84 29 .00 11.00
1984/85 21.00 _
1985/86 22.00 21.61
1986/87 41.38 23.42
1987/88 40.50 27.15
1988/89 45.15 40.00
1989/90 35.99
Source: Laws of Lesotho (various years) and Department of
Economics and Marketing
It is very difficult to evaluate the performance of Co-op Lesotho 
because of goverenment subsidies. Co-op Lesotho's marketing 
margin is low and this is amianly because of government subsidy. 
For the period 1980/81 to 1989/90, the average Co-op Lesotho 
maize marketing margin was 11 percent of the producer price while 
for wheat the average marketing margin was 6 percent. It seems 
the major problem facing Co-op Lesotho is the low quantities of 
grain it handles such that it does not realise economies of 
scale.
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4.4 Market Signals
4.4.1 Grading
The grain grading system in place in Lesotho is basically RSA 
grain grading system. Factors affecting maize grades are 
percentages of defective kernels, kernels of another colour, 
foreign matter and infestation by weevils. The maize grading 
system is divided into white and yellow. White and yellow maize 
each consists of 4 grades. White maize consists of WM1, WM2, WM3 
and WM4 (undergrade) while yellow maize consists of YM1, YM2, YM3 
and YM4 (undergrade). The mills accept all the grades except 
undergrade which is not suitable for human consumption but for 
animal feed. Consumers in Lesotho and Southern Africa prefer 
white maize meal to yellow maize meal which means yellow maize 
is mainly used for stock feeding. Yellow maize meal has been 
used in the drought years of the early 1980's and nl990 when 
millers were required to blend white and yellow maize. Maize 
delivered to mills has to be of moisture content of 12.5-14 
percent.
Sorghum and wheat grading also follow RSA grades except that 
with regards to sorghum RSA makes a distinction between white 
and dark sorghum whereas Lesotho does not. Factors involved in 
sorghum grading are the same as for maize except for kernels of 
other colours. Sorghum is graded into 4 grades; GC1, GC2, GC3 and 
GDI while wheat is graded into 6 grades; A 1 , A2, Bl, B2, B3 and 
undergrade. Wheat with moisture content exceeding 13 percent is 
not purchased by the mills. Grading is done at the point of sale 
i.e. Co-op Lesotho depots and the mills.
Grain producer prices are set according to grades with the best 
grades fetching relatively higher prices than the lower grades. 
Thus farmers who produce the better grades are rewarded more than 
farmers producing lower grades. Grading used to be done only at 
the mills which meant grain marketed though Co-op Lesotho was
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not graded at the depots but at the mills. The major problem 
with this was that Co-op Lesotho used to pay the average prices 
for the grades in order not to incur losses. This worked to the 
disadvantage of the farmers producing better grades. This meant 
that farmers producing the lower grades were paid same prices as 
farmers producing the better grades. Usually RSA maize and wheat 
boards run grading courses for Co-op Lesotho and the mills 
personnel.
The major problem with the grain grading system in Lesotho is 
that grades are not gazetted. Most if not all, farmers have no 
idea what qualities should different grades have. In the 1988/89 
marketing season many farmers' maize was not accepted by the 
mills because the moisture content was too high (Motamo). Most 
farmers did not understand why their maize was said to be 
unacceptable. The Agricultural Marketing (Preparation of Maize 
for Human Consumption or Processing for Human consumption) 
Regulations 1975 do not comprehensively spell out the qualities 
needed for the different grades. Another problem with the grain 
grading system is that there is no final tribunal to settle 
disputes arising from the grading system. If a farmer's maize 
is not accepted by the mill or a farmer claims his maize is WM1 
while the mill claims it is WM3 there is nowhere such a dispute 
can be settled. This problem can be solved by having the 
Department of Economics and Marketing of MOA or the Department 
of Crops of MOA settle such disputes. A number of MOA personnel 
have been trained in grain husbandry under the African Grain 
Management Program financed by the Australian Government. The 
plan is to have these personnel placed either in the Department 
of Economics and Marketing or the new organisation that will take 
over the activities of Co-op Lesotho ( M.Molupe, Personal 
Communication, July 1989).
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4.4.2 Timing of Producer Price Announcements
As previously indicated, maize and sorghum producer prices are 
announced in May which is just before the harvesting season while 
wheat prices are also announced just before harvest around 
October/November. The major disadvantage of announcing producer 
prices just before harvest is that it makes pre-production 
planning difficult. It may also lead to stockpiling by the 
mills, traders and consumers. The mills can import large 
quantities of grain (wheat and maize) just before producer price 
announcement and then store the grain. After the grain is stored 
it is milled and sold at the new prices. In this way the mills 
are in a position to earn above normal profits. The possible 
stockpiling of grain by the mills can also work to the 
disadvantage of Basotho farmers because after stockpiling the 
mills silos are full and the mills are not in a position to 
purchase the domestic grain. Sometimes the stockpiling of grain 
by the mills can work to the advantage of consumers and this 
occurs when the mills and traders sell grain products at the old 
prices after the new price announcements. Prior to 1986 when LMC 
was the only maize mill in the country, it used to adhere to 
prices as they were announced. With the establishment of LMM, the 
mills tend not to adhere to prices as they are announced. For 
example in 1988/89 marketing year, new maize meal prices were 
announced in June 1988 but the mills kept on selling at the old 
prices until around September/October. Evidence suggests that 
the maize mills do not stockpile and this is mainly because of 
inadequate storage facilities and cash flow problems (Table 
4.11). Traders can also stockpile grain products just before 
price announcements. Millers claim that the demand for maize 
meal usually increases about 40 percent above the monthly average 
during April. They explain that this increase is due to traders 
and consumers buying in anticipation of the price increase the 
following month (May).
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It seems Lesotho has no alternative with regards to the timing 
of producer prices announcement as long as it still relies on 
RSA for food grain supplies. Malawi has had pre-season price 
announcements for several years while Swaziland started in the 
1988/89 season. It can be argued that Malawi has not experienced 
problems because it is self-sufficient in grains but it will be 
interesting for both Botswana and Lesotho to see consequences in 
Swaziland.
Table 4..11: Maize Imports bv Mill s (Tonnes)
Month 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Jan. 6932 10765 8938 11496 14119
Feb. 6368 8056 11861 16253 16935
March 6687 12756 9652 12611 10695
April 9455 10998 10985 11905 9995
May 6632 11323 11672 6970 17735
June 4120 10356 10148 11326 11374
July 1870 6042 3385 11624
Aug. - 1770 2932 1335
Sept. 625 3337 - 7889
Oct. 4750 12703 3585 12400
Nov. 6460 13716 3500 22655
Dec. 9878 9973 8002 11990
Total 63777 111795 86460 138460
Source: Department of Economics and Marketing, MOA.
4.5 Equity in Marketing
4.5.1 Producer Equity
The policy of the Lesotho Government is to have equitable 
producer prices. Prior to 1982/83, producers were not allowed 
to deliver grain to the mills but to Co-op Lesotho which then 
delivered the grain to the mills. Under this system producers 
received equal prices all over the country. This system on the 
one hand worked to the advantage of producers located long
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distances from the mills. On the other hand it worked to the 
disadvantage of producers located near the mills because they 
could have delivered grain directly to the mills and obtained 
better prices. Thus producers located near the mills subsidized 
producers located far from the mills. The system of having 
uniform producer prices throughout the country although having 
equitable income distribution is not price efficient. It is not 
price efficient because transportation costs over space are not 
reflected.
In 1982/83, FSSP was in a position to market large quantities 
of maize which Co-op Lesotho could not handle. It should be 
noted that hitherto Co-op Lesotho had been handling little 
quantities of maize. Because Co-op Lesotho could not handle 
FSSP maize it was decided that FSSP should be allowed to deliver 
the maize directly to the mills. Individual farmers were also 
allowed to market maize directly to the mills. This has led to 
most farmers located in the northern and central Lowlands and 
Foothills of the country marketing maize directly to the mills 
as the maize mills are located in these regions while farmers 
located in the southern Lowlands, the southern Foothills and 
Mountains tend to market through Co-op Lesotho.
Under the present marketing system (i.e. after 1982/83) whereby 
producers can market grain directly to the mills, price 
variations amongst producers exist. Producers marketing directly 
to the mills receive relatively higher prices than producers 
marketing through Co-op Lesotho. This is because producers 
marketing through co-op Lesotho receive the millgate price less 
Co-op Lesotho handling charges. Producers marketing directly to 
the mills receive the millgate price less their transportation 
and handling costs which are in most instances less than Co-op 
Lesotho's. Most farmers claim that Co-op Lesotho handling 
charges are too high such that it is now common for farmers to 
come together and hire private trucks to deliver maize/wheat 
directly to the mills.
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4.5.2 Consumer Equity
After the grain is milled it is sold to wholesalers who in turn 
sell to retailers. Retailers then sell to consumers. It is 
difficult to determine the retail price of grain products. For 
example one tonne of maize grain can be milled into different 
types of maize meal or maize samp. In Lesotho maize is milled 
into special sifted, sifted and unsifted while wheat is milled 
into cake flour, bread flour and wheat meal. In order to 
estimate the millgate prices of maize meal we consider millers 
margin. From the millgate prices we have wholesale and retail 
prices. A millers margin shows how much it costs to mill one 
tonne of maize. Wheat millers margins were difficult to obtain 
so only maize millers margins are presented below.
Table 4.12: Maize Millers Margin (M/tonne)
Year Marqin
1980/81 _
1981/82 -
1982/83 48.50
1983/84 53.20
1984/85 68.13
1985/86 47.14
1986/87 90.24
1987/88 125.50
1988/89 139.75
1989/90 173.94
Source : Department of Economics and Marketing, MOA
Before the Lesotho agricultural marketing system became 
regulated/controlled, free market grain products prices 
prevailed. The major retail price determinant seemed to have 
been transportation costs. This is because retail prices tended 
to increase with distance from the rail heads where the products 
were delivered and then transported into the country. In 1973, 
the retail prices of grain products began to be regulated. This 
was effected with the passing of the Agricultural Marketing 
(Price Control) Regulations 1973. Under these regulations,
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maximum selling prices of wheat and maize products were gazetted. 
Section 3(1) of the regulations state that "no trader shall sell 
any controlled product at a price greater than the maximum price 
fixed for that product in the schedule hereto". Although traders 
were given an option of selling at prices below the maximum 
prices, most of them charged maximum gazetted prices. Those 
traders charging prices below the maximum prices did so because 
of competition from other traders.
For maize meal, traders were given a margin of 9 percent of the 
suppliers' prices as the retail margin. Traders were further 
allowed to charge one percent of the cost price per metric tonne 
per kilometre to cover transport costs. Retail grain sorghum 
prices followed the same pricing formula. In the early 1980's 
the maize meal and grain sorghum retail pricing formula was done 
away with. It was replaced by gazetting maximum millgate,
wholesale and retail prices for wheat and maize products.
Starting in 1987 the Ministry of Agriculture has been gazetting 
millgate prices only with wholesale and retail price gazetting- 
being the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The gazetting of maximum wheaten and maize products retail prices 
is to ensure that uniform prices prevail over the country. In 
practice retail prices are not uniform. Traders do not follow 
the maximum gazetted retail prices. Most traders charge higher 
prices than the gazetted. The Ministry of Agriculture's
Marketing Inspectors are supposed to monitor gazetted prices. 
If traders do not adhere to the gazetted prices, Marketing
Inspectors can prosecute them. Marketing Inspectors have not 
been monitoring trader adherence to gazetted prices because they 
claim they do not have co-operation of the Police who are the 
ones empowered to prosecute traders charging prices that are 
higher than the gazetted ones.
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4.6 Storage Capacity
4.6.1 On-farm Storage
At the farm level, grain was traditionally stored in grass 
baskets (Lisiu) which are no longer in use. Nowadays farmers 
store grain in bags or in the open covered with tarpaulins. 
These methods of storing grain result in significant losses 
caused by rodents, insects and weather elements.
The Farm Structures Project financed by the Swedish International 
Development Assistance (SIDA) through FAO has been holding 
demonstrations to teach farmers how to build small stone/brick 
silos of 15-50 bag capacity which greatly reduces grain storage 
losses (B. Sherriff and M. Mofolo, Personal Communication, 14lh 
August, 1989). In order to avoid storage losses, farmers usually 
market the surplus grain immediately after harvest. Since 
producer prices are the same throughout the marketing season and 
there is therefore no incentive for farmers to store grain, 
deliveries to the mills and Co-op Lesotho tend to be concentrated 
in a relatively short period. This overtaxes the buying and 
storage facilities of the mills and Co-op Lesotho. It is common 
to see farmers being turned away with grain because the mills' 
silos are full. In the past farmers used to sell grain to 
traders immediately after harvest and purchase it back later 
This meant traders acted as storage agents for farmers. This 
practice is one of the major causes of traders being barred from 
handling farm produce. The complaint was that traders were 
selling back the grain to farmers at prices which more than 
covered storage and other costs. Tarbox (1979) findings are 
otherwise.
4.6.2 Mills' Storage
The formal storage capacity for maize in Lesotho is approximately
36,000 tonnes while wheat storage capacity is 30,000 tonnes. The
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I.MM is capable of storing significant quantities of maize as its 
silos can hold 30,000 tonnes. This means LMM can store all the 
commercially marketed maize produced within the country. Even 
though LMM silos can store all the commercially marketed maize 
in Lesotho, storage problems are prevalent. Farmers delivering 
maize to Maseru prefer MRM to LMM. Even if farmers are advised 
that they should deliver to LMM because MRM silos are full, they 
would rather wait several days for MRM to start purchasing maize. 
The major reason being conditions of payment. Farmers claim 
that MRM pays expeditiously while with LMM they have to wait 
several days for payment. It can be argued that the practices 
by RSA marketing boards to charge the same prices throughout the 
year makes the mills in Lesotho not to invest in storage 
facilities. Indications are that at present RSA marketing boards 
are contemplating on charging for storage which means garin 
prices will not be uniform throughout a marketing season.
4.6.3 Grain Spoilage
Grain spoilage can significantly reduce food and income available 
to farmers. Usually grain losses occur during the processes of 
harvesting, threshing, storage and processing. In Lesotho grain 
is harvested by hand (labour) and mechanical harvesters (e.g. 
combine harvesters). Whether harvesting by hand or mechanical 
harvesters some grain will be left on the stalks (e.g. maize). 
Grain threshing methods in use include hand, animals and 
mechanical threshers. Shelling maize by hand is the most 
efficient method as little grain is damaged but the process is 
laborious and tedious especially when large quantities are to be 
shelled. The traditional methods of threshing maize and sorghum 
is by beating with sticks while wheat is threshed using animals. 
The beating of grain with sticks and animals trampling on grain 
usually result in some kernels being broken and thrown out of the 
threshing ground. Winnowing also results in grain losses as some 
of the grain is lost. Mechanical threshers are supposed to 
separate and winnow the grain but some are not good at winnowing 
such that rewinnowing by hand is usually necessary. Thus
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whatever method of harvesting and threshing is used, grain losses 
occur with some methods being more efficient than others.
Grain must be dried before storage to prevent deterioration, 
inhibit germination and limit the growth of fungi and bacteria. 
In most cases grain in Lesotho is harvested mature and dry but 
there are years the grain matures during wet periods and this 
necessitates rapid drying to prevent grain spoilage. If grain 
is delivered to the mills not dry enough, the mills incur costs 
of drying the grain. The common method of drying grain in
Lesotho is sun drying. When drying grain, care must be taken to 
ensure that the grain is not over-dried. Over-dried grain is 
subject to breakage, discolouration and reduced nutritional 
value.
At present harvest and post-harvest grain losses are not known 
in Lesotho. There have been claims that harvest and post-harvest 
losses are significantly high in Lesotho. For instance it has 
been estimated that the post-harvest losses in Lesotho are 15 
percent for maize and sorghum and 20 percent for wheat (FAO, 
1986). The basis for these estimates is not known and have not 
been investigated. In order to ascertain the harvest and post­
harvest grain losses and ways for improvement, research on this 
should be undertaken. The FAO undertook a study to assess the 
post-harvest food losses in Swaziland in 1981 and 1982 (FAO, 
1984). The study's results indicate that pre and post-harvest 
maize losses in Swaziland in 1981 was 22.75 percent and in 1982 
(7-9 months) was 16.15 percent. A similar study should be 
undertaken in Lesotho.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The major grains produced in Lesotho are maize, wheat and 
sorghum. In the late 1800s, grain production was the most 
important source of income to Basotho. Most of the grain 
produced in Lesotho was exported to the mining centres of RSA. 
By the end of the 19 th century Lesotho grain production 
experienced a decline which was in part caused by the 
introduction of taxes to force Basotho to work in RSA mines, the 
imposition of duties on grain from Lesotho to RSA and stiff 
competition offered to Lesotho grain by the importation of the 
cheap grain from the highly capitalized agriculture of the 
American midwest and Australia. Lesotho grain production 
declined such that by the early 1930s, Lesotho become a net 
importer of grains, notably maize. This situation has continued 
to the present time.
The Lesotho grain marketing system has evolved from being 
dominated by private traders to the present whereby parastatals 
are dominating. From the 1800s, private traders sold consumer 
goods and purchased agricultural produce from farmers. Traders 
continued to be the dominant grain marketing agents until 
marketing co-operatives were first established in the late 1940s. 
Marketing co-operatives were primarily established because 
producers felt that traders were costing too much or that the 
services which they provided were inadequate. Farmers thought 
by eliminating the middlemen (traders), marketing costs could be 
lowered which would result in a gain to them in the form of 
higher prices. The major activities of co-operatives was retail 
trading in consumer goods and the supply of agricultural inputs 
rather than purchasing farm produce. By the early 1960s the co­
operative movement collapsed. It collapsed because of problems 
within the movement which included mismanagement, overpayment of
5.1 CONCLUSIONS
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staff and misappropriation of funds. Co-operatives also 
collapsed because of restrictive practices by traders on both 
farmers and co-operatives.
After independence in 1966, there was an apparent shift in 
government policy with regard to agricultural marketing in the 
country. Whereas the colonial government tended to be in favour 
of private traders, the new government became inclined towards 
the promotion of public institutions in marketing agricultural 
produce in the country. In 1973, the Produce Marketing 
Corporation (PMC) was established. PMC handled grains and their 
products, pulses, fruits and vegetables. It operated through a 
network of licensed traders who acted as its agents. PMC folded 
in 1979 because of several problems which included lack of 
skilled management, no rational pricing structure for crop 
purchases and lower volumes of marketed throughput than planned.
After PMC collapsed in 1979 its operations were taken over by 
Co-op Lesotho which is still in operation. Even though Co-op 
Lesotho is registered as a co-operative, the government's share 
capital in the organization makes it a parastatal.
The present Lesotho grain marketing system is dominated by Co­
op Lesotho and the mills. Maize marketing channels in Lesotho 
consist of farmers, area-based projects, maize mills, Co-op 
Lesotho, traders, wholesalers and retailers.
The purpose of the study was to analyse the performance of the 
Lesotho grain marketing system. The purpose was achieved by 
firstly giving a broad perspective of the development of the 
Lesotho grain production and marketing system. The second step 
was to develop performance measures applicable to the Lesotho 
grain marketing system while the last step has to evaluate if the 
Lesotho grain marketing system met the list of performance 
measures developed.
Several conclusions emerge from the study. Although the study
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was concerned with grain marketing, grain production was also 
examined as the two are interlinked. Evidence suggests that the 
major problem facing Lesotho with regards to food grain supply 
is low and declining production. The reasons for the low and 
declining production are several but it seems the major cause is 
low yields. As a result of the low food grain production Lesotho 
is increasingly depending on commercial and donated imports.
Evidence suggests that low quantities of grain are marketed 
through formal marketing channels. Estimates are that between 
10-20 percent of the grain production in the country goes through 
formal marketing channels. This reflects the subsistence nature 
of farming in Lesotho. The low marketed quantities have 
efficiency implications for the marketing outlets as they do not 
enjoy economies of scale. The often heard complaint in Lesotho 
is that Co-op Lesotho is "inefficient". It can be argued that 
Co-op Lesotho is "inefficient" because it handles very low 
quantities of grain such that its marketing costs per unit of 
produce handled are relatively high.
Evidence also suggests that since the early 1970s the number of 
marketing outlets has declined as a result of government policy 
of promoting parastatals in the agricultural marketing system and 
restricting private traders from participating in agricultural 
marketing. The effect of the few marketing outlets on production 
are not really known but it can be argued that since most of the 
grain is marketed through informal marketing cchannels, the 
effect of reduced marketing outlets is minimal.
One other major feature of the Lesotho grain marketing system 
is that it is very much dependent on RSA grain marketing system. 
In addition to commercial imports, Lesotho is dependent on RSA 
in pricing and grading. This dependency is mainly caused by the 
geo-political situation of Lesotho to the RSA. In addition 
Lesotho is a member of SACU and RMA and as such it is to her 
advantage to deal with RSA.
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The other feature of the Lesotho grain marketing system is that 
informal grain prices tend to be higher than formal grain prices 
with the gap narrowing in recent times. The higher informal 
market prices reflect that demand exceeds supply.
The policy of the Lesotho government is to have equitable 
producer and consumer prices. Prior to 1982/83, producers 
received equal prices irrespective of their location. After 
1982/83, producer prices differ by location. Producers marketing 
direct to the mills get relatively higher prices than producers 
located long distances from the mills. Consumer prices are 
supposed to be uniform throughout the country but this not so in 
practice. In practice traders do not follow the maximum gazetted 
retail prices but charge higher prices.
Grain storage at the farm level is usually in bags or in the 
open covered with tarpaulins. These methods of storing grain 
result in significant losses. In order to avoid storage losses 
farmers usually market the surplus grain immediately after 
harvest and this overtaxes the buying and storage facilities of 
Co-op Lesotho and the mills. The formal storage capacity in 
place in the country is capable of storing all the commercially 
marketed grain in the country. In spite of this, storage 
problems still exists.
Indications are that harvest and post-harvest grain losses are 
relatively high in Lesotho. This has serious implications for 
the availability of grain for consumption.
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the analysis presented in this report, the 
following recommendations are made :
(i) Private traders and consumers should be represented 
in the Agricultural Pricing Committee.
(ii) The Department Economics and Marketing should conduct
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independent cost of production studies.
(iii) The gazetting of millgate, wholesale and retail prices
should continue with much emphasis being on the 
inspection of traders adherence to gazetted prices. 
(iv) Grain grading regulations should be gazetted and an
educational programme be undertaken to explain the 
regulations.
(v) Private traders should be allowed to be involved in
the grain marketing system as well in agricultural 
inputs. This will increase the number of marketing 
outlets as well as providing competition to Co-op 
Lesotho.
(vi) The maize mills and wheat mill storage capacities
should be expanded especially as RSA might start 
charging for storage costs in the near future.
(vii) Studies should be undertaken on harvest and post­
harvest grain losses and ways to improve them.
(viii) Government's role in grain marketing should be 
concentrated more on regulating, monitoring and 
facilitating the efficient operation of the 
marketing system.
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Appendix A
Lesotho Exports of Wheat. Maize and Sorghum (1873-1972^
Year Wheat Maize Sorahum
Ouantitv Valuef) Ouantitv Valuer) Ouantit’,
('OOOlbs) ('OOOlbs) ('OOOlbs
1873 (Total of 100,000 bags)
1891 19,026 13,265
1892 13,256 4,037
1893 25,748 63,416 13,156 17,452 953
1894 25,964 44,426 13,620 16,265 1,305
1895 30,215 74,475 16,486 33,857 736
1896 9,496 45,111 19,995 75,522 NA
1897 11,790 52,599 12,915 42,424 949
1898 3,997 17,450 19,870 32,590 2,948
1899 766 3,074 2,674 9,319 NA
1900 1,481 4,909 4,137 11,450 NA
1901 4,981 14,845 9,983 29,104 NA
1902 7,124 19,342 17,089 46,621 1,699
1903 23,255 81,847 12,158 55,014 5,171
1904 3,228 13,765 2,462 10,106 356
1905 2,440 9,693 16,290 33,883 NA
1906 9,116 3,224 13,081 26,083 NA
1907 3,679 12,724 36,117 73,468 NA1908 8,898 31,420 11,509 21,269 2,656
1909 12,511 48,979 36,431 75,201 1,382
1910- 1915 NA
1916 14,101 99,302 36,250 90,835 14,4601917 13,558 105,552 20,233 57,954 4,2891918 25,421 199,169 8,862 27,399 833
1919 51,231 357,278 10,427 44,911 6,467
1920 17,739 218,386 5,751 21,352 3,8241921 22,077 152,762 8,696 16,992 NA
1922 25,641 138,995 4,063 11,188 NA
1923 12,829 71,791 17,432 41,409 10,5141924 6,172 32,492 1,953 6,939 2,9261925 16,720 105,558 14,212 34,553 NA
1926 20,680 111,694 1,112 3,092 NA1927 20,714 115,455 7,502 17,663 4,4121928 23,656 131,414 20,155 59,295 6,1941929 14,421 64,408 17,481 42,144 7,4111930 26,262 105,330 1,212 2,169 8061931 20,741 90,888 59 168 2,0491932 39,375 168,015 382 765 1,3001933 11,164 45,102 21 71 _1934 17,909 - 335 _ 151935 36,218 - 1,621 _ 371936 19.250 - 79 _ 131
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Year Wheat Maize Sorqhum
Quantity 
('OOOlbs)
Value( ) Ouantity 
('OOOlbs)
Value() Ouantitv 
('OOOlbs)
1937 34,288 _ 972 _ 504
1938
1939-45
30,555 - 5,239
NA
- 10,554
1946 25 - 106 248
1947 22,755 - 7,691 - 16,193
1948 18,106 - 6,929 - 17,278
1949 39,378 - 4,078 - 2,443
1950 9,222 - - - 7,513
1951 5,015 - - - 4,354
1952 12,069 - - - 17,997
1953 10,935 - - - 11,590
1954 8,706 - - - 3,474
1955 16,410 - - - 2,034
1956 18,328 - - - 1,129
1957 12,145 - - 2,001
1958 3,502 - - - 2,373
1959 10,486 - - - 136
1960 18,776 - - - 1,165
1961 12,325 - - - 318
1962 3,481 - - - -
1963 11,449 - - - -
1964 24,580 - - - -
1965 6,600 - - - -
1966 1,134 - - - -
1967 4,417 - - - -
1968 21,893 - - - -
1969 30,024 - - - -
1970 4,671 - - - -
1971 3,672 - - - -
1972 5,560 - - - -
Source: Pim(1935), Basutoland Government, Basutoland Department
of Agriculture, Stutley(1960),
Council(1964) and Eldredge(1986)
Basutoland National
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Appendix B
Lesotho Imports of Wheat. Maize and Sorghum(1919-1971) 
Year Wheat & Wheatinea 1 Maize & Maizemeal Sorghum
Quantity Value(  ^ Quantity Value() Quantity Value() 
('OOOlbs) ('OOOlbs) ('OOOlbs)
1919 403 4,351 5,085 26,004 2,256 11,6351920 325 4,996 8,305 54,445 3,068 23, 0891921 257 2,932 10,390 36,104 2,502 10 3601922 297 2,644 7,317 25,176 2,625 10 677
1923 426 3,762 2,005 8,242 580 2 552
1924 933 7,582 16,458 69,928 6,574 28 963
1925 669 6,458 7,885 32,785 6,988 27 4751926 948 8,395 11,178 39,607 5,051 19 7661927 1,185 9,506 9,320 34,155 1,690 9 631
1928 1,384 10,460 3,059 10,925 680 3 1241929 1,083 8,837 5,010 17,398 863 3, 0301930 1,036 6,760 12,283 30,318 2,166 7 090
1931 983 7,529 27,980 63,302 275 1 015
1932 779 6,386 19,144 41,880 386 1 291
1933 1,735 10,381 71,232 217.007 5,004 17 0281934 2,010 14,770 27,756 97,105 15,610 47 9561935 1,180 8,311 20,306 51,476 10,046 26 6961936 1,316 8,446 41,547 145,728 4,704 22 8681937 1,276 9,282 11,103 37,049 2,133 8 6511938 1,617 12,852 6,603 18,988 444 1 8201939 1,966 14,141 7,182 21,023 1,098 3 5751940- 44 NA
1945 4,125 37,896 14,181 175,856 5,784 32 6081946 5,628 51,084 34,951 227,701 1,292 17 3261947 2,869 27,708 4,707 36,612 476 4 9941948 2,742 25,836 1,638 9.903 390 3 0101949 6,950 61,623 61,439 361,113 3,125 30 5921950 6,863 61,393 12,661 73,751 2,220 20 6891951 8,070 76,957 33,053 259,122 1,966 22 1911952 9,908 110,802 30,945 276,535 1,415 16 2511953 7,200 84,365 8,289 73,477 764 8 6841954 6,363 89,597 10,151 99,146 1,131 11 4451955 9,386 105,995 43,876 394,824 3,719 52 9871956 7,013 92,242 26,497 251,720 2,875 31 2011957 6,463 86,357 18,193 113,982 1,691 24 3151958 7,707 98,622 22,086 193,118 1,219 17 1221959 8,800 116,518 23,378 314,263 2,247 24 3521960 8,496 116,037 46,260 462,602 584 15 8421961 7,563 107,625 30,670 356,278 971 13 5711962 8.434 116.118 3,424 534,336 2.327 33 822
92
Year Wheat & Wheatinea 1 Maize & Maizemeal Sorghum
Quantity Value() Quantity Value() 
('OOOlbs) ('OOOlbs)
1963-1965 NA
1966 - - 64,679
1967 - - 44,634
1968 - - 60,059
1969 - - 70,194
1970 - - 66,389
197 1______ 3_________ =_________ 48,046________
Quantity Value() 
('OOOlbs)
Source: Basutoland Department of Agriculture, Stutley(1960) ,
Basutoland National Council(1964), and Bureau of Statistics
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